Indian Journal of Industrial Relations: Economics & Social Dev.

Open Access Open Access  Restricted Access Subscription Access
Open Access Open Access Open Access  Restricted Access Restricted Access Subscription Access

A Game Theoretic Approach to Conciliation-Adjudication Model


Affiliations
1 Strategic Management Area, Indian Institute of Management–Indore
     

   Subscribe/Renew Journal


This paper revisits the effectiveness of the conciliation mechanism used to resolve industrial disputes in India. The conciliation mechanism in its current form is replete with delays and is generally ineffective in resolving disputes. This often results in the reference of the disputes to adjudication, which is, even more time consuming. The aggregate delay in justice is akin to the same being denied. This raises questions on the effectiveness of conciliation mechanism and its relevance at the broader policy level. This paper considered a combination of the conciliation and adjudication and proposed a model using game theoretic approach for the more efficient disposal of industrial disputes.
Subscription Login to verify subscription
User
Notifications
Font Size


  • Alexandre, M. (2006), Pay, Reference Points and Police Performance, National Bureau of Economic research Inc. Working Papers: 12202.

  • Ashenfelter, O., Currie, J., Farber, H.S., & Spiegel, M. (1992), “An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems”, Econometrica, 60(6): 1407-33.

  • Brams, S. J. & Merrill, S. (1983), “Equilibrium Strategies for Final Offer Arbitration: There Is No Median Convergence”, Management Science, 29(8): 927-41.

  • Brams, S. J. & Merrill, S. (1986), “Binding versus Final Offer Arbitration: a Combination Is Best”, Management Science, 32(10): 1346-56.

  • Chatterjee, K. (1981), “Comparison of Arbitration Procedures: Models with Complete and Incomplete Information”, IEEE Trans. Systems, Man, Cybernet., SMC-11 (Feb): 101-09.

  • Crawford, V.P. (1982), “A Comment on Farber’s Analysis of Final Offer Arbitration”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 26: 157-60

  • Dickinson, D.L. (2006), “The Chilling Effect of Optimism: the Case of Final Offer Arbitration”, Journal of Socio-Economics , 35(1): 17-30.

  • Farber, H. S. (1980), “An Analysis of Final Offer Arbitration”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24: 683-705.

  • Farmer, A., Pecorino, P. & Stango, V. (2004), “The Causes of Bargaining Failure: Evidence from Major League Baseball”, Journal of Law and Economics, 47(2): 543-68.

  • Hanany, E., Kilgour D.M., & Gerchak, Y. (2006), “How the Prospect of Final-Offer Arbitration Affects Bargaining”, Management Science, Link: http://www.eng.tau.ac.il/ ~ygerchak/publications.html dated 20.08.06.

  • Indiastat.com: Source : Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No.585, dated 27.07.2000 & Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 3238, dated 05.08.2002.

  • Phillips, W. G. (1956), “Government Conciliation in Labour Disputes: Some Recent Experience in Ontario”, Revue Canadienne d’Economique et de Science Politique , 22(4): 523-34.

  • Porter, M. E. (1996), “What is Strategy?” Harvard Business Review, Nov-Dec : 61-78.

  • Rao, G.S. (2001), “Arbitration & Conciliation Law in India - A Review”, retrieved on 22.08.06 link: http://www.ficci.com/icanet/quterli/ oct-dec2001/OCT4.htm

  • Wittman, D. (1986), “Final Offer Arbitration”, Management Science, 32(12): 1551-61.


Abstract Views: 469

PDF Views: 0




  • A Game Theoretic Approach to Conciliation-Adjudication Model

Abstract Views: 469  |  PDF Views: 0

Authors

Shubhabrata Basu
Strategic Management Area, Indian Institute of Management–Indore

Abstract


This paper revisits the effectiveness of the conciliation mechanism used to resolve industrial disputes in India. The conciliation mechanism in its current form is replete with delays and is generally ineffective in resolving disputes. This often results in the reference of the disputes to adjudication, which is, even more time consuming. The aggregate delay in justice is akin to the same being denied. This raises questions on the effectiveness of conciliation mechanism and its relevance at the broader policy level. This paper considered a combination of the conciliation and adjudication and proposed a model using game theoretic approach for the more efficient disposal of industrial disputes.

References