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Fallibilism and Organizational Research


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1 Australian Graduate School of Management University of New South Wales Sydney 2052, NSW, Australia
     

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Epistemology is the study of knowledge - of what is known and how we know it. Organizational epistemology is dominated by the dualist opposition of objectivist and subjectivist philosophies of science. Objectivists accept knowledge claims as potentially true and warranted on objective evidence, whereas subjectivists ground knowledge in perception, phenomenology and social construction. Though these two perspectives differ in their ontologies (the reality of constructs and relations) and methodologies (how these relations can be observed), both views accept that reliable organizational knowledge is possible. This paper introduces a third epistemological perspective - fallibilism - and shows how neglect of this third epistemology has constrained advance in the objectivist-subjectivist debate. Fallibilism, which challenges the foundations and reliability of knowledge claims, occupies a significant place in every major philosophical tradition, but contradicts the prevailing rhetoric of knowledge-claiming in organizational research, and has been systematically excluded from the debate. In this article we present the foundations and precepts of fallibilism, show how its absence has invited divisive and sectarian dogmatism, and explore its potential contributions to organizational research.

Keywords

Fallibilism, Organizational Research, Dogmatism, Epistemology
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  • Fallibilism and Organizational Research

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Authors

Thomas C. Powell
Australian Graduate School of Management University of New South Wales Sydney 2052, NSW, Australia

Abstract


Epistemology is the study of knowledge - of what is known and how we know it. Organizational epistemology is dominated by the dualist opposition of objectivist and subjectivist philosophies of science. Objectivists accept knowledge claims as potentially true and warranted on objective evidence, whereas subjectivists ground knowledge in perception, phenomenology and social construction. Though these two perspectives differ in their ontologies (the reality of constructs and relations) and methodologies (how these relations can be observed), both views accept that reliable organizational knowledge is possible. This paper introduces a third epistemological perspective - fallibilism - and shows how neglect of this third epistemology has constrained advance in the objectivist-subjectivist debate. Fallibilism, which challenges the foundations and reliability of knowledge claims, occupies a significant place in every major philosophical tradition, but contradicts the prevailing rhetoric of knowledge-claiming in organizational research, and has been systematically excluded from the debate. In this article we present the foundations and precepts of fallibilism, show how its absence has invited divisive and sectarian dogmatism, and explore its potential contributions to organizational research.

Keywords


Fallibilism, Organizational Research, Dogmatism, Epistemology

References