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Enablers and Barriers of Civil Military Relations in India:An Interpretive Structural Modeling Approach


Affiliations
1 Symbiosis International (Deemed University), Pune – 411020, Maharashtra, India
2 Symbiosis Institute of Business Management, Pune – 411020, Maharashtra, India
 

Background: Civil Military Relations (CMR) is a complex mix of explicit, implicit, traditions, precedence, evolutions, powers forming part of the social contract that underpins the country`s governance. Arena of CMR is strategic. There are a few factors known as CMR Enablers and Barriers (EBs), which affect CMR. Objective: To study the basic relationships amongst the shortlisted EBs. Also to understand the driver and driven EBs. Methods and Analysis: Interpretive Structural Modeling (ISM) technique with Micmac Analysis was used. The inter-se and inter relationships between the EBs was derived. EBs was further categorized, based on their ability to drive others or their dependence on others. Ultimately, how critical each factor is for the success of CMR was identified. Findings: Legacy, Leadership and National Interest were found to be most critical EBs since they have individual effect on building a dynamic CMR which is of immense importance in Nation building by ensuring cohesiveness among Civil and Military parlors. Conclusion/Further Study: Enablers and Barriers are the key in the effective CMR implementation process. Conclusively, all ten EBs are relevant although they exhibit a varying degree of relative importance. Future study, could quantify the framework obtained from ISM model, using Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP).
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  • Enablers and Barriers of Civil Military Relations in India:An Interpretive Structural Modeling Approach

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Authors

Sanjeev Sharma
Symbiosis International (Deemed University), Pune – 411020, Maharashtra, India
Poornima Tapas
Symbiosis Institute of Business Management, Pune – 411020, Maharashtra, India

Abstract


Background: Civil Military Relations (CMR) is a complex mix of explicit, implicit, traditions, precedence, evolutions, powers forming part of the social contract that underpins the country`s governance. Arena of CMR is strategic. There are a few factors known as CMR Enablers and Barriers (EBs), which affect CMR. Objective: To study the basic relationships amongst the shortlisted EBs. Also to understand the driver and driven EBs. Methods and Analysis: Interpretive Structural Modeling (ISM) technique with Micmac Analysis was used. The inter-se and inter relationships between the EBs was derived. EBs was further categorized, based on their ability to drive others or their dependence on others. Ultimately, how critical each factor is for the success of CMR was identified. Findings: Legacy, Leadership and National Interest were found to be most critical EBs since they have individual effect on building a dynamic CMR which is of immense importance in Nation building by ensuring cohesiveness among Civil and Military parlors. Conclusion/Further Study: Enablers and Barriers are the key in the effective CMR implementation process. Conclusively, all ten EBs are relevant although they exhibit a varying degree of relative importance. Future study, could quantify the framework obtained from ISM model, using Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP).

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.17485/ijst%2F2018%2Fv11i24%2F121419