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Theory of Patronized Goods. Liberal Evolution of Paternalism


Affiliations
1 Institute of Economy, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow, Russian Federation
 

The neo-classical principles of rational behavior are considered in the context of the nature of paternalism as the basis of the Theory of patronized goods. The formation of society’s normative interests is discussed in concern of political aspects. The article illustrates the theoretical and the practical aspects of the concept of consociation democracy, providing liberalization of the institutions for making political and economic decisions. The results of analysis reveal a pattern of paternalism drifting towards institutional liberalization. Proposed a hypothesis explaining why the economic policy in modern Russia still remains somewhere between archaic and merit paternalism.

Keywords

Patronized Goods, Rational Behavior, Merit Paternalism, Consociational Democracy.
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  • Theory of Patronized Goods. Liberal Evolution of Paternalism

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Authors

Aleksandr Yakovlevich Rubinstein
Institute of Economy, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow, Russian Federation

Abstract


The neo-classical principles of rational behavior are considered in the context of the nature of paternalism as the basis of the Theory of patronized goods. The formation of society’s normative interests is discussed in concern of political aspects. The article illustrates the theoretical and the practical aspects of the concept of consociation democracy, providing liberalization of the institutions for making political and economic decisions. The results of analysis reveal a pattern of paternalism drifting towards institutional liberalization. Proposed a hypothesis explaining why the economic policy in modern Russia still remains somewhere between archaic and merit paternalism.

Keywords


Patronized Goods, Rational Behavior, Merit Paternalism, Consociational Democracy.

References





DOI: https://doi.org/10.15759/ijek%2F2016%2Fv4i1%2F190284