Politics and Governance

Open Access Open Access  Restricted Access Subscription Access

Linkages of Electoral Accountability: Empirical Results and Methodological Lessons


Affiliations
1 Department of Political Science, Oklahoma State University, 700 N. Greenwood, Tulsa, OK, 74106, United States
 

A basic theory of electoral accountability is widely accepted by academic opinion: voters cause politicians to gain or lose office through periodic elections, thereby influencing policy through the threat of electoral sanction. Empirical studies run the gamut from findings of strong support for this theory, to mixed or conditional support, to weak or negative results. When electoral processes are analyzed in terms of two distinct causal linkages within a three-part chain of accountability, however, positive findings are revealed as weaker than they appear while a compelling trend emerges toward findings ranging from conditional to negative in the last two decades. This trend is visible in three topical areas - economic voting, political corruption, and ideological congruence - and it holds for both presidential and parliamentary regimes as well as for a variety of electoral systems. The new electoral skepticism's unsettling results and insightful methods may help to improve future research and reform efforts alike.

Keywords

Accountability, Congruence, Corruption, Economic Voting, Elections.
User
Notifications
Font Size


  • Adsera, A., Boix, C., & Payne, M. (2003). Are you being served? Political accountability and quality of government. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 19, 445-490.

  • Alcaniz, I., & Hellwig, T. (2011). Who's to blame? The distribution of responsibility in developing democracies. British Journal of Political Science, 41, 389-411.

  • Alt, J., Bueno de Mesquita, E., & Rose, S. (2011). Disentangling accountability and competence in elections: Evidence from U.S. term limits. Journal of Politics, 73, 171-186.

  • Anderson, C. J. (2007). The end of economic voting? Contingency dilemmas and the limits of accountability. Annual Review of Political Science, 10, 271-296.

  • Ansolabehere, S., & Snyder, J. M. (2008). The end of inequality: 'One person, one vote' and the transformation of American politics. New York: Norton.

  • Arnold, R. D. (1990). The logic of congressional action. New Haven: Yale University Press.

  • Ashworth, S. (2012). Electoral accountability: Recent theoretical and empirical work. Annual Review of Political Science, 15, 183-201.

  • Barreiro, B. (2007). Explaining the electoral performance of incumbents in democracies. In J. M. Maravall & I. Sanchez-Cuenca (Eds.), Controlling governments: Voters, institutions, and accountability (pp. 17-44). New York: Cambridge University Press.

  • Bengtsson, A. (2004). Economic voting: The effect of political context, volatility, and turnout on voters' assignment of responsibility. European Journal of Political Research, 43, 749-767.

  • Besley, T. (2006). Principled agents? The political economy of good government. New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Besley, T., & Burgess, R. (2002). The political economy of government responsiveness: Theory and evidence from India. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 1415-1452.

  • Bovitz, G. L., & Carson, J. L. (2006). Position-taking and electoral accountability in the U.S. House of Representatives. Political Research Quarterly, 59, 297-312.

  • Budge, I., Keman, H., McDonald, M. D., & Pennings, P. (2012). Organizing democratic choice: Party representation over time. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Bueno de Mesquita, B., Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R. M., & Smith, A. (1999). An institutional explanation of the democratic peace. American Political Science Review, 93, 791-807.

  • Burden, B. C. (2000). Voter turnout and the National Election Study. Political Analysis, 8, 389-398.

  • Canes-Wrone, B., & Shotts, K. W. (2004). The conditional nature of presidential responsiveness to public opinion. American Journal of Political Science, 48, 690-706.

  • Carson, J. L., & Jenkins, J. A. (2011). Examining the electoral connection across time. Annual Review of Political Science, 14, 25-46.

  • Chang, E. C. C., Golden, M. A., & Hill, S. J. (2010). Legislative malfeasance and political accountability. World Politics, 62, 177-220.

  • Cheibub, J. A., & Przeworski, A. (1999). Democracy, elections, and accountability for outcomes. In A. Przeworski, S. C. Stokes & B. Manin (Eds.), Democracy, accountability, and representation (pp. 222-249). New York: Cambridge University Press.

  • Duch, R. M., & Stevenson, R. T. (2008). The economic vote: How political and economic institutions condition election results. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

  • Ebeid, M., & Rodden, J. (2006). Economic geography and economic voting: Evidence from the U.S. states. British Journal of Political Science, 36, 527-547.

  • Erikson, R. S., MacKuen, M. B., & Stimson, J. A. (2002). The macro polity. New York: Cambridge University Press.

  • Fearon, J. D. (1999). Electoral accountability and the control of politicians. In A. Przeworski, S. C. Stokes & B. Manin (Eds.), Democracy, accountability, and representation (pp. ix, 351 p.). New York: Cambridge University Press.

  • Fellowes, M. C., & Wolf, P. J. (2004). Funding mechanisms and policy instruments: How business campaign contributions influence Congressional votes. Political Research Quarterly, 57, 315-324.

  • Ferejohn, J. (1999). Accountability and authority: Toward a theory of political accountability. In A. Przeworski, S. C. Stokes & B. Manin (Eds.), Democracy, accountability, and representation. New York: Cambridge University Press.

  • Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2008). Exposing corrupt politicians: The effects of Brazil's publicly released audits on electoral outcomes. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123, 704-745.

  • Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2011). Electoral accountability and corruption: Evidence from audits of local governments. American Economic Review, 101, 1274- 1311.

  • Gailmard, S., & Jenkins, J. A. (2009). Agency problems and electoral institutions: The Seventeenth Amendment and representation in the Senate. American Journal of Political Science, 53, 324-342.

  • Gasper, J. T., & Reeves, A. (2011). Make it rain? Retrospection and the attentive electorate in the context of natural disasters. American Journal of Political Science, 55, 340-355.

  • Gelineau, F. (2007). Presidents, political context, and economic accountability: Evidence from Latin America. Political Research Quarterly, 60, 415-428.

  • Gerken, H. (2009). The democracy index: Why our election system is failing and how to fix it. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

  • Gilens, M. (2011). Affluence and influence: Economic inequality and political power in America. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

  • Godbout, J.-F., & Belanger, E. (2007). Economic voting and political sophistication in the United States: A reassessment. Political Research Quarterly, 60, 541-554.

  • Gomez, B. T., & Wilson, J. M. (2006). Cognitive heterogeneity and economic voting: A comparative analysis of four democratic electorates. American Journal of Political Science, 50, 127-145.

  • Gomez, B. T., & Wilson, J. M. (2007). Economic voting and political sophistication: Defending heterogeneous attribution. Political Research Quarterly, 60, 555-558.

  • Grant, R. W., & Keohane, R. O. (2005). Accountability and abuses of power in world politics. American Political Science Review, 99, 29-44.

  • Grimmer, J. (2013). Appropriators not position-takers: The distorting effects of electoral incentives on Congressional representation. American Journal of Political Science, 57, 624-642.

  • Hardin, R. (2000). Democratic epistemology and accountability. Social Philosophy and Policy, 17, 110-126.

  • Hellwig, T. (2012). Constructing accountability: Party position-taking and economic voting. Comparative Political Studies, 45, 91-118.

  • Hellwig, T., & Samuels, D. (2008). Electoral accountability and the variety of democratic regimes. British Journal of Political Science, 38, 65-90.

  • Hobolt, S. B., & Hoyland, B. (2011). Selection and sanctioning in European parliamentary elections. British Journal of Political Science, 41, 477-498.

  • Holbrook, T. M., Clouse, C., & Weinschenk, A. C. (2012). Bringing the president back in: The collapse of Lehmann Brothers and the evolution of retrospective voting in the 2008 presidential election. Political Research Quarterly, 65, 263-274.

  • Huber, G. A., & Gordon, S. C. (2004). Accountability and coercion: Is justice blind when it runs for office? American Journal of Political Science, 48, 247-263.

  • Huber, G. A., Hill, S. J., & Lenz, G. S. (2012). Sources of bias in retrospective decision-making: Experimental evidence on voters' limitations in controlling incumbents. American Political Science Review, 106, 720-741.

  • Hussey, W., & Zaller, J. (2011). Who do parties represent? In P. K. Enns & C. Wliezen (Eds.), Who gets represented? (pp. 247-284). New York: Russell Sage.

  • Jacobs, L. R., & Shapiro, R. Y. (2000). Politicians don't pander: Political manipulation and the loss of democratic responsiveness. Chicago: University Press of Chicago.

  • Jones, D. R. (2010). Partisan polarization and Congressional accountability in House elections. American Journal of Political Science, 54, 323-337.

  • Jones, P. E. (2011). Accountability for policy positions and policy outcomes in Congress. Journal of Politics, 73, 764-782.

  • Kassow, B. J., & Finocchiaro, C. J. (2011). Responsiveness and electoral accountability in the U.S. Senate. American Politics Research, 39, 1019-1044.

  • Kelly, J. M. (2003). Economic and political accountability in Fujimori's Peru. Journal of Politics, 65, 864-880.

  • Kenney, C. D. (2003). Horizontal accountability: Concepts and conflicts. In S. Mainwaring & C. Welna (Eds.), Democratic accountability in Latin America (pp. 55-76). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Kunicova, J., & Rose-Ackerman, S. (2005). Electoral rules and constitutional structures as constraints on corruption. British Journal of Political Science, 35, 573-606.

  • Lederman, D., Loayza, N. V., & Soares, R. R. (2005). Accountability and corruption: Political institutions matter. Economics and Politics, 17, 1-35.

  • Lee, D. S., Moretti, E., & Butler, M. J. (2004). Do voters affect or elect policies? Evidence from the U.S. House. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, 807-859.

  • Lewis-Beck, M. S., & Stegmaier, M. (2000). Economic determinants of electoral outcomes. Annual Review of Political Science, 3, 183-219.

  • Mainwaring, S. (2003). Introduction. In S. Mainwaring & C. Welna (Eds.), Democratic accountability in Latin America (pp. 3-33). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Maloy, J. S. (2008). The colonial American origins of modern democratic thought. New York: Cambridge University Press.

  • Maloy, J. S. (2011). The first Machiavellian moment in America. American Journal of Political Science, 55, 450-462.

  • Manin, B. (1997). The principles of representative government. New York: Cambridge University Press.

  • Manin, B., Przeworski, A., & Stokes, S. C. (1999). Elections and representation. In A. Przeworski, S. C. Stokes & B. Manin (Eds.), Democracy, accountability, and representation. New York: Cambridge University Press.

  • Maravall, J. M. (1999). Accountability and manipulation. In A. Przeworski, S. C. Stokes & B. Manin (Eds.), Democracy, accountability, and representation (pp. 222-249). New York: Cambridge University Press.

  • Maravall, J. M. (2010). Accountability in coalition governments. Annual Review of Political Science, 13, 81-100.

  • Marsh, M., & Tilley, J. (2010). The Attribution of Credit and Blame to Governments and Its Impact on Vote Choice. British Journal of Political Science, 40, 115-134.

  • Mayhew, D. R. (1974). Congress: The electoral connection. New Haven: Yale University Press.

  • McCormick, J. P. (2011). Machiavellian democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

  • McDonald, M. D., Mendes, S. M., & Budge, I. (2004). What are elections for? Conferring the median mandate. British Journal of Political Science, 34, 1-26.

  • Meinke, S. R. (2008). Institutional change and the electoral connection in the Senate: Revisiting the effects of direct election. Political Research Quarterly, 61, 445-457.

  • Moreno, E., Crisp, B. F., & Shugart, M. S. (2003). The accountability deficit in Latin America. In S. Mainwaring & C. Welna (Eds.), Democratic accountability in Latin America (pp. 79-131). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Pande, R. (2011). Can informed voters enforce better governance? Experiments in low-income democracies. Annual Review of Economics, 3, 215-237.

  • Pereira, C., Melo, M. A., & Figueiredo, C. M. (2009). The corruption-enhancing role of re-election incentives? Counter-intuitive evidence from Brazil's audit reports. Political Research Quarterly, 62, 731-744.

  • Powell, G. B. (2000). Elections as instruments of democracy: Majoritarian and proportional visions. New Haven: Yale University Press.

  • Powell, G. B. (2004). The chain of responsiveness. Journal of Democracy, 15, 91-105.

  • Powell, G. B., & Whitten, G. D. (1993). A cross-national analysis of economic voting. American Journal of Political Science, 37, 391-414.

  • Rubenstein, J. (2007). Accountability in an unequal world. Journal of Politics, 69, 616-632.

  • Rudolph, T. J. (2003). Institutional context and the assignment of political responsibility. Journal of Politics, 65, 190-215.

  • Samuels, D. (2004). Presidentialism and accountability for the economy in comparative perspective. American Political Science Review, 98, 425-436.

  • Schedler, A. (1999). Conceptualizing accountability. In A. Schedler, L. Diamond & M. F. Plattner (Eds.), The self-restraining state: Power and accountability in new democracies. Boulder: L. Rienner.

  • Shapiro, I. (2005). The flight from reality in the human sciences. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

  • Singer, M. J. (2010). Who says it's the economy? Cross-national and cross-individual variation in the salience of economic performance. Comparative Political Studies, 44, 284-312.

  • Snyder, J. M., & Stromberg, D. (2010). Press coverage and political accountability. Journal of Political Economy, 118, 355-408.

  • Stokes, S. C. (1999). What do policy switches tell us about democracy? In A. Przeworski, S. C. Stokes & B. Manin (Eds.), Democracy, accountability, and representation (pp. 98-130). New York: Cambridge University Press.

  • Tavits, M. (2007a). Clarity of responsibility and corruption. American Journal of Political Science, 51, 218-229.

  • Tavits, M. (2007b). Principle vs. pragmatism: Policy shifts and political competition. American Journal of Political Science, 51, 151-165.

  • Wlezien, C., & Soroka, S. N. (2012). Political institutions and the opinion-policy link. West European Politics, 35, 1407-1432.

  • Zielinski, J., Slomczynski, K. M., & Shabad, G. (2005). Electoral control in new democracies: The perverse incentives of fluid party systems. World Politics, 57, 365-395.


Abstract Views: 277

PDF Views: 101




  • Linkages of Electoral Accountability: Empirical Results and Methodological Lessons

Abstract Views: 277  |  PDF Views: 101

Authors

J. S. Maloy
Department of Political Science, Oklahoma State University, 700 N. Greenwood, Tulsa, OK, 74106, United States

Abstract


A basic theory of electoral accountability is widely accepted by academic opinion: voters cause politicians to gain or lose office through periodic elections, thereby influencing policy through the threat of electoral sanction. Empirical studies run the gamut from findings of strong support for this theory, to mixed or conditional support, to weak or negative results. When electoral processes are analyzed in terms of two distinct causal linkages within a three-part chain of accountability, however, positive findings are revealed as weaker than they appear while a compelling trend emerges toward findings ranging from conditional to negative in the last two decades. This trend is visible in three topical areas - economic voting, political corruption, and ideological congruence - and it holds for both presidential and parliamentary regimes as well as for a variety of electoral systems. The new electoral skepticism's unsettling results and insightful methods may help to improve future research and reform efforts alike.

Keywords


Accountability, Congruence, Corruption, Economic Voting, Elections.

References