Analysis of the Evolution Game of Stakeholders’ Behaviour in the Operation Stage of Green Buildings

This study aims to solve the problem of uncoordinated interests among the stakeholders in the operation stage (OS) of green buildings (GBs). First, the requirements and conflicts between the owners and property service enterprises (PSEs) are analysed. Secondly, the evolutionary game model of owners and PSEs is developed. It was found that the game system will evolve towards the ideal equilibrium stability strategy only under the following conditions: (i) the income of owners in green property management (GPM) is greater than the sum of the income of PSEs shared by the owner in GPM and the transaction costs generated when the owners choose to support GPM, and (ii) the sum of the income of PSEs shared by the owner in GPM and the additional benefits that PSEs can get by choosing GPM is greater than the total cost incurred by PSEs in choosing GPM. We carried out quantitative tests for equilibrium stability results and analysed the factor that influence the evolution path based on simulations performed in MATLAB. The results show that improving the operational income of GBs, increasing the additional income of PSEs, reducing the operating transaction costs and adopting a reasonable revenue sharing method are effective ways to coordinate the interests of all parties involved in the OS of GBs.