

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & MANAGEMENT

The Role of Institutional Reform Tools in Combating Rent-Seeking: The Case of Oromia Regional State, Ethiopia

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Abstract:

The objective of the study was to assess the challenges and prospects of institutional reform tools implementation in combating rent-seeking in public institutions in Oromia Regional State so as to indicate possible remedies for the identified challenges.

The study attempts to examine the extent to which the implementation of reform tools has contributed in combating rent-seeking by creating awareness about the interrelation between institutional reform tools implementation and rent seeking among leaders, job performers and citizens. The study also attempts to identify the major challenges related to institutional reform tools implementation in combating rent seeking.

To attain these objectives, the study employed both quantitative and qualitative research approaches. The data were gathered through questionnaires, interviews, and focus group discussions from leaders, job performers and customers/citizens at woreda, zonal and regional level. All data gathered by the close-ended questions of the questionnaires were analyzed quantitatively using frequency count, percentages, and Pearson chi-square test. Besides, the data obtained from open-ended questions, interviews and focus group discussions were transcribed to supplement the quantitative data.

The study reveals that the awareness of leaders, civil servants and the citizens on the contribution of institutional reform tools implementation in combating rent seeking was low. It also shows that training for awareness creation on the benefits of institutional reform tools implementation in combating rent seeking was not satisfactory. On the other hand, the study indicates that the redesigning of work flow and one-stop-shopping service delivery system developed through BPR, team work and coordination spirit advanced through the formation of Development Army have contributed a lot in combating rent seeking.

Low commitment and unethical behaviors among professionals as well as loose accountability system and loose follow up and monitoring, and resistance to institutional reform tools implementation were found to be the major challenges of institutional reform tools' contribution in combating rent seeking.

The study recommends all the concerned institutions especially the Public Service and Human Development Bureau and Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission to develop different communication strategies like conducting workshops, training, seminars, as well as preparing and distributing pamphlets, notices, head letters, memos and business cards in order to create common or shared understanding on the role of institutional reform tools implementation in fighting rent seeking among leaders, service providers(performers) and the citizens at large at all administrative tire of the region.

1. The Problem and Its Approach

This part deals with the background, statement of the problem, objectives of the study, significance of the study, delimitation of the study, the research methodology, limitation of the study, definition of key terms and organization of the study.

1.1. Background

Different international and national organizations demand for responsive government administration systems. As the papers that were presented at the sixth global forum on "Reinventing Government" held in Seoul, making public administration and governance more responsive to the needs of citizens is one of the most important aims of the United Nations programme.

As different public opinion surveys imply, mostly, government is observed by citizens and sometimes by public servants and political leaders themselves, as slow, inefficient, bureaucratic, change-resistant, incompetent, unresponsive or corrupt. Citizens often complain that governments provide services that are inadequate, inappropriate, inferior or too costly. Frequently, people see government officials to be acting in their own interests rather than responding to the needs of citizens. However, the public wants improvements in the ways in which government serves the citizens. It demands public organizations that delivers better services and extends their reach and coverage more effectively and efficiently. Citizens expect improvements in the capacity of the public service to deliver more and better services at lower cost. The tax payer is demanding the government officials to provide goods and services without any act of corruption (UN World Public Sector Report, 2001).

As the result of pressures of globalization and technological innovation and more widespread access to communications, citizens in many countries began demanding more from their government. These rising expectations, too often, have led to growing

dissatisfaction with or lack of trust in government. As the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) noted, the growing dissatisfaction with government performance has increased pressures for reform in Europe (2002).

In the same way in our country, the public organizations' working systems were designed before the modern information, communication and technologies. The systems cannot serve the current number of service recipient which are highly increasing from time to time. It is poorly structured and designed to satisfy their customers' service demand and accomplish their mission and vision.

Based on the study of the preceding government's economic, social and political policy and working systems, the government of Ethiopia has arrived at notion of undertaking massive policy and structural transformation. Since 2003, Ethiopia has launched a National Capacity Building Program which is the most comprehensive institutional development program to be carried out by Ministry of Capacity Building. To implement this National Capacity Building programs, the government has developed fourteen different capacity building programs among which the Public-Sector Capacity Building Program (PSCAP) has given priority as it has a major role to the development system as a whole and basically considered to have prior impact on the remaining programs and have cross-cutting effect on all sectors.

According to the Ministry of Capacity Building of Ethiopia, the problems identified by the taskforce established by the government have necessitated the initiative of redesigning and implementing Business Process Reengineering as one of the major reform tools to bring a radical change in the public sectors.

Based on the above national initiatives, the Oromia National Regional Government has undertaken a massive transformation to change the previous organizational structure and working systems and facilities. As per the study conducted by different organizations such as International Leadership Institute (ILI), Oromia Public Service College, Oromia Capacity Building Bureau, and different individuals, the institutional reform initiative has provided remarkable results with all its limitations.

As it is stated in UNDP report (2007), government officials' corruption and rent seeking is probably the largest factor hindering the efforts of change to eliminate poverty in the developing world. It hinders development and perpetuates poverty. According to the report, rent seeking and corruption causes about 40 per cent of the population in Asia and Africa to live below the poverty line.

According to Transparency International Manual, when rent seeking and corruption is widespread, slow reforms are not likely to be a solution. It needs more comprehensive reforms by creating strong political determination through effective anti-corruption programmes; focusing on prevention and improving systems by changing values; identifying the government activities most prone to the problem of rent seeking; enforcing accountability mechanisms and learn from good practices; enacting comprehensive anti-corruption legislation; establishing broad ownership of reforms by creating strong partnerships with civil society and the private sector; and making corruption and rent seeking "high risk" and "low profit."

1.2. Statement of the Problem

In order to achieve their goal, institutions have been working in dynamic world environment. This continuously changing world environment influences the institutions in one way or another to make change and survive. Institutions, while making an effort to survive, some were dissolved; some others sustain their activities and survive. To this end, institutions have been exercising different approaches for their own survival. In line with this, Marian (1998) identified different kinds of approaches of reform tool to make an institution effective and efficient. It helps the institutions to develop transparency, accountability, remove bureaucratic systems, reduce rent seeking, create strong political will, etc. which also play a vital role in ensuring good governance.

The implementation of reform tools in our country in general and in our region in particular now lasting more than a decade in government institutions. But government is disclosing that even though we are reforming our institutions we couldn't clear the attitude and practice of rent seeking. Especially, Revenue authorities, Government purchase, contract administration, and Land administration are the major sources. But as indicated by Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission report of 2009 the attitude and practices are prevailing here and there in any service providing institutions.

Rent seeking increases transaction costs and uncertainty in an economy while lowering efficiency and effectiveness. It leads to misallocation of scarce resources while distorting investment priorities and technology choice. It undercuts the state's ability to raise revenues and hence results in higher tax rate on fewer taxpayers and poor provision of essential public goods and services. It is regressive in the sense that its costs and negative economic impact tend to fall more heavily on small enterprises and on individuals in a weak economic position (ibid). It also affects poverty alleviation programs negatively by distorting developmental decision-making (Andrew Wedeman, 2004). This widens the gap between the poor and the rich, which manifests the adverse relationship of rent seeking and reform. Therefore, it is double risk for the poor and the powerless. In general, it is widely recognized that rent seeking is a serious problem and threat to economic, political and social development, social stability, democracy, human rights, morality and poverty reduction.

In line with this, both federal and regional anti-corruption commissions have conducted several system studies which show the malpractice and loop holes for rent seeking (Reports, 2012). This shows that we do have certain gaps in implementing our reform tools.

In general, our regional government is implementing several reform tools in its institutions, on the other hand it is disclosing in its several reports that the rent seeking behavior and practice as it is prevailing in its institutions and enterprises. This is where we are interested to assess the role of institutional reform in combating rent seeking in Oromia regional state. Therefore, the study addressed the following research questions:

1. To what extent the implementation of institutional reform tools has contributed to combat rent-seeking?
2. What are the major challenges of institutional reform tools implementation in combating rent seeking?
3. How can we alleviate the pitfalls that encounter institutional reform in combating rent-seeking?

1.3. Objectives of the Study

The general objective of this study is to assess the role of institutional reform tools in combating rent-seeking and to indicate possible remedies for the identified challenges.

1.3.1. Specific Objectives

The study is used to attain the following specific objectives.

1. To identify the extent to which institutional reform tools has contributed in combating rent-seeking.
2. To assess the awareness of the leaders, job performers and citizens about the interrelation between institutional reform tools and rent seeking
3. To identify the major challenges of institutional reform tools in combating rent seeking
4. To identify the strategies to overcome (alleviate) the pitfalls in implementing reform tools for combating rent-seeking.

1.4. Significance of the Study

This study will have the following significance:

- The result of this study may provide regional, zonal, woreda and kebele officials some basic information and feedback about the contribution of reform in combating rent seeking,
- It may enable the regional government to design strategies that help to alleviate the pitfalls that hinder its effectiveness,
- It may help to foreword some specific and practical recommendations for future actions on the basis of the findings made,
- The result of the study may draw clearly needed lessons to be learned by others,
- Finally, the study may help as a stepping stone for other individuals who are interested to deal with similar matters for further investigation.

1.5. Delimitations of the Study

This study intends to assess the challenges and prospects of reform tools implementation in combating rent seeking in Oromia regional state. It is geographically delimited to this region. It is intended to assess the awareness created about reform tools in relation to rent seeking, the major problems encountered in its contribution/designing and implementation in reducing rent seeking, the attitude of leaders, performers and citizens in relation to rent seeking and reform, and the strategies to be used in order to alleviate the pitfalls/challenges in achieving the intended objectives.

1.6. Limitations of the Study

During the undertaking of the study different obstacles were faced. Of the different problems faced the researchers' difficulty to get job performers and leaders because of frequent field trips and meetings, involuntary of job performers for focus group discussion and respondents' reluctance to fill and return the questionnaires on time were the major ones.

1.7. Definition of Key Terms

Leaders: Refers to all top officials and process owners.

Job Performers: Refers to all non- managerial civil servants in the civil service organizations that have no responsibility to supervise others, but who are trained and skillful in some field.

1.8. Organization of the Study

This paper is organized into five chapters, the first chapter deals with the introductory part which include background of the study, statement of the problem, objectives of the study, significance of the study, delimitation, limitation, and organization of the study. In chapter two reviews of relevant related literature were treated with that can guide the researcher in the study. The methodology of the research was presented in the third chapter. After the description of methodology, data analysis and presentation was presented in chapter four. Finally, the summary, conclusions and recommendations of the study were treated in chapter five

2. The Literature Review

2.1. Basic Concepts of Corruption and Rent-seeking

The dictionary meaning of rent seeking is obtaining a monopoly for high profits: the activity of companies or individuals of obtaining privileges such as a monopoly right over a product or service in order to increase their income.

In economics, rent-seeking is an attempt to obtain economic rent by manipulating the social or political environment in which economic activities occur, rather than by creating new wealth. As it is described by Shepherd, A. Ross (1970), economic rent is terminology used by economists to define one aspect of the price of goods and services. It designates the difference between the costs of everything needed to produce the goods or service and the price for which it is sold. In the analysis, economic rent is determined for each of the factors of production that are used to produce the good or service. Usually economic rent is due to some exclusivity such as, for labor, it could be due to famous person or skill; for a good, it may be due to the power of a patent; for real estate, it may be due to a favorable location. This implies that, if there is no exclusivity and there is perfect competition, there are no economic rents, as competition drives prices down to their floor.

Although rent seeking and corruption are intimately related, they are not the same thing. They are highly intertwined because officials can utilize their power of rent creation as a means of bribe seeking. At the same time, economic actors frequently pay bribes to officials as a means of rent seeking. Despite their close relation, rent seeking and corruption belong to different empires of practices (Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston, 2001).

As the study by Tak-Wing Ngo (2009), Chinese law and official policy considers almost all forms of official malfeasance by state and party cadres as rent seeking. This range from crimes with material returns such as embezzlement of public property, fraud, bribery, tax evasion, smuggling, profiteering, and rent seeking; to power abuses such as negligence, collusion, sectionalism, and nepotism; to improper behavior of officials such as womanizing, gambling, drinking, stock market speculation, extravagant living, and superstition. As Andrew Wedeman states others prefer a narrower definition confining to the usurpation/diversion of public authority for private gains as corruption proper, while discounting nonmaterial forms of official malfeasance such as power abuse and misconduct. Even among those who prefer the narrower definition, many regard rent seeking as a form of corruption (2004).

Here maintaining a conceptual distinction between corruption and rent seeking is important. While the creation, allocation, and pursuit of economic rents are prone to corruption, these activities do not necessarily involve corruption in the form of usurpation/diversion of public authority for private gains. Rent allocation can only be possible if a bond of trust already exists between the rent creator and the rent seeker. A relationship based on shared trust is established before bribes are exchanged for favoritism.

As it is stated on the study of "Rent Seeking and Government-Business Relations in China" by Tak-Wing Ngo, rent seeking is said to be common phenomenon in developing countries. Economic players (including foreign investors) recognize that they have to compete not just in market performance but also in obtaining policy preferences, securing bureaucratic support, and cultivating personal networks. Rent seeking threatens the phenomenon as a disease to economic development. Economists believe that bureaucratic intervention in market activities creates economic rents, often in the form of monopolistic profits, for a privileged few. They argue that competition for such economic rents generates social waste. Rent seeking is thus seen as creating inefficiency and hence is harmful to economic development. Tak-Wing Ngo believes that the study of rent seeking is a good means to understand the political economy of market reform and government-business relations.

2.2. Good Practices in Combating Rent Seeking

Transparency International Manual, 2000 specifies the following countries' rent seeking combating practices as good examples. The Independent Commission against rent seeking and corruption in Hong Kong was empowered to investigate and prosecute/accuse corruption cases and to promote public education and awareness. The commission receives a large number of complaints from the public. Surveys showed its effectiveness, measured by the reduction in the level of corruption as a result of its activities. The commission's success was due to the strong political will and long-term commitment of the government, the independence of the commission, and the resources at its disposal to pursue its investigation and prosecution of those involved in corrupt practices, public education programmes, and the active participation of an informed public.

The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau in Singapore had sufficient resources, highly qualified staff, a supportive legal framework, an independent judiciary, and a competent public administration system. The case of Singapore shows the significance of an independent commission in combating corruption. The government has undertaken several steps to reduce incentives for corruption including increasing wages of civil servants and improving their working conditions, rotating officials, and increasing supervision.

The Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) in Botswana can investigate and prosecute offenders, prepare strategies to combat corruption, and provide public education and training. With a high conviction rate and collection of fines in excess of its operating costs, DCEC is perceived in the region as a good practice of combating corruption in a democratic country. Many factors account for Botswana's success in combating corruption such as the operational independence and prosecution powers of the Directorate, the focus on strong enforcement, financial independence, and viability. The country's achievement was also based on a favorable political climate, state capacity to govern, effective civil service reforms, macroeconomic stability, a strong resource base, and the record-keeping capacity of the government (ibid).

The Integrity Pact (IP) in the Republic of Korea provides a mechanism to ensure that all bidders for a city's construction projects, technical services, and procurement are required to sign a pact/promise/contract to fight corruption. During the bidding stage, the IP is explained to bidders and only those who agree to fulfill the IP are qualified to register their submissions. At the same time, a related government official submits the "Principal's Oath/promise to the IP." During the contract's finalization and execution, both parties must sign a "Special Condition for Contract." Provisions are made to protect and reward those reporting inside corruption. Violators of the pact are disqualified by the city from submitting bids or face termination of existing contracts. They are banned from bidding for other contracts for six months to two years.

The culture of transparency, accountability and the rule of law are essential in combating rent seeking. In Swedish, public officials have to post very extensive information about their activities including travel expense reports. India established the practice of posting the names of corrupt officials under investigation – the so-called "E-Shame" – to help deter corrupt practices. Greater transparency in government, simplification of regulations, better compensation and motivation of public servants, and public exposure of corrupt officials are some of the many innovations that check corruption (Dennis A, 2003).

The resolution passed by the United Nations General Assembly requests member states to design and implement strategies to combat rent seeking. The Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) has approved an anti-corruption convention, making the bribery of public officials in developing countries by multinational corporations a criminal offence (ibid).

2.3. Major Causes of Rent Seeking

According to UNDP Policy Paper, 1997, the basic cause of rent seeking is monopoly and discretion without adequate accountability. This implies that the expanding role of government in development has placed bureaucracy in a monopolistic position and enhanced opportunities for unlimited administrative discretion. Rent seeking results from excessive regulation, and the lack of an adequate, accountable, and transparent system. The government intervenes in the economy to provide a framework for economic and social activities that includes protection of personal and property rights, provision of public goods not supplied by the market, redistribution of income, and the provision of opportunities for education, health, and employment. However, government intervention is also likely to expand the discretion of public officials to make decisions. It is the misuse of unchecked/unrestricted discretion that is one of the primary causes of rent seeking.

A study commissioned by the United Nations identifies five main causes of rent seeking. First, payments are made for goods and services that are available below the market price. Examples include producer goods being sold both at the government subsidized prices and on the free market; setting the price of oil at an artificially low level; payoffs/bribes for getting credit are source of corruption in different countries. Conditions for corruption are extensive when a service is scarce because only those with the ability to pay the highest price are able to obtain the goods or services.

Second, bribes are observed as it serves as incentive payments for government officials to undertake their tasks. Firms and individuals are willing to pay in order to avoid delays in cases where government department does not provide its services on time. Third, bribes are also assumed to reduce transaction costs for firms when governments impose regulations and enforce criminal laws. It tends to reduce the regulatory load. When a government has inefficient regulations, and imposes high taxes on businesses, it avoids regulations and taxes which may raise the efficiency of a firm. Therefore, to lower their costs firms make a coalition with those charged with public regulation and enforcement, and the benefits are divided between the firm and the public official. Such practices result in savings for the firm but the revenue losses for the government limit its ability to perform its tasks effectively and efficiently.

Fourth, payments to obtain major contracts, special consideration and privatization of government owned enterprises are the main causes of grand corruption. Such type of payments for government officials has a significant impact on government budgets. Payments are made by a firm for the officials who are in charge of bidding to be included on the list of pre-qualified bidders, to gain inside information, to have bidding specifications structured in its favor or simply to avoid quality controls systems.

Finally, the business climate is negatively affected where the judiciary is perceived to be corrupt and the legal and regulatory framework is not enforced. Businesses seek private arbitrators/judges/go-betweens and use other mechanisms such as protection by organized crime to operate in a country.

Other causes of domestic corruption include loopholes in laws that define corruption itself. Conflicts of interest of those directly involved in decision making, inadequate funding for the civil service, and weak systems of government auditing and monitoring. It also likely to increase where the press is not free to expose misuse of authority and public resources through advocacy and public awareness and where political opposition is weak to expose corrupt practices.

2.4. Basic Concepts and Problems of Reform and Public Administration

Different international studies show the existence of dissatisfaction with public administration. As it is stated on the United Nation Publication printed in United States of America in 2007, in Latin America only about half of the respondents believed that the state enforces laws effectively; about 72 per cent of those surveyed did not trust the government to know how to spend tax money; 66 per cent of the region's inhabitants expressed little or no confidence in the judiciary; and only about 30 per cent thought that the government had made progress in reducing corruption in state institutions.

On the same publication, it states that surveys of more than 21,500 people in 12 African countries showed widespread dissatisfaction with the performance of governments in the region. Out of the total surveyed respondents, 60 per cent are responded to be satisfied fairly badly or very badly; about 62 per cent were dissatisfied with government performance in keeping prices stable; 48 per cent believed that it did not effectively fight corruption in government. In Europe, public opinion surveys point out that in 2005; only 51 per cent of the people interviewed by Eurobarometer had confidence in the European Parliament.

Doing things, the "old way" no longer meets the demands of a more complex and interconnected international economy or the expectations of a more globally-linked and politically-aware citizenry. Globalization has brought stronger competition among businesses and pressures on governments to create economic, political and social conditions within which the private sector can compete more effectively and in which people can develop their human resources to benefit from participation in productive activities (Eurobarometer, 2000).

According to Osborne, David and Gaebler, in Mexico, the government is seeking ways of "doing more with less" by applying new technologies to make government tasks more efficient, and of combating rent seeking through education, prevention and penalties. As a part of its reform agenda, Mexico has been seeking to create a government of quality under internationally accepted regulations; professionalizing the public service through career development programmes and training; and pursuing deregulation so that government does not hinder its citizens from participating effectively in the world economy and from expanding their horizons (2006).

According to Jonathan Walters, (2002), experience has shown that government reinvention faces strong obstacles and opposition from those benefiting from the status quo. Innovations often fail when there is not strong support for them by political leaders and heads of government; when those advocating change within government either are not rewarded for their efforts or are punished or penalized; and when governments withhold sufficient resources to implement the changes effectively. Innovations and often fail because civil service systems are inflexible in allowing government agencies to hire the types of people who are needed to implement them or because of strong opposition within government agencies to changing traditional ways of doing things. The unwillingness of

bureaucracies to cooperate with or support each other and conflicts over resource allocations also undermines the success of changes and innovations.

Therefore, political and government leaders, or groups within or outside of government seeking to promote service delivery improvements and other innovations in the public sector must plan not only for the implementation of substantive changes but also for averting the obstacles that can delay, weaken or threaten them.

Principles at the heart of good governance are participation, pluralism, subsidiary, transparency, accountability, equity, access, partnership, and efficiency. The essence of public administration as a democratic institution is to use the principles of good governance to design and structure state institutions, their internal processes and mechanisms, and their mission (UNDP Policy Paper, 1997)

Accountability is the pillar of democracy and good governance that force the government, the private sector, and civil society to focus on results, seek clear objectives, develop effective strategies, and monitor and report on performance. It implies holding individuals and organizations responsible for performance measured as objectively as possible.

Accountability has three dimensions. Financial accountability implies an obligation on the part of the person(s) handling resources, or holding public office or any other position of trust, to report on the intended and actual use of the resources. Political accountability means regular and open methods for sanctioning or rewarding those who hold positions of public trust through a system of checks and balances. Administrative accountability implies systems of control internal to the government, including civil service standards and incentives, ethics codes, and administrative reviews.

Transparency promotes openness of the process through reporting and feedback, clear processes and procedures, and the conduct and actions of those holding decision-making authority. It makes understandable information and clear standards accessible to citizens.

Integrity completes the continuum of accountability and transparency since it is essential to the concept of professional ethics. It is synonymous with incorruptibility or honesty. It requires that holders of public office do not place themselves under financial or other obligations to outside individuals or organizations that may influence them in the performance of their official duties.

3. Research Methodology

In undertaking the study both qualitative and quantitative research approaches were used. Descriptive research method was employed as it was the appropriate method which enables the research to assess and describe the contribution of institutional reform tools implementation in government institutions in combating rent seeking.

3.1. Sources of Data

Both primary and secondary data sources were used to conduct the research.

3.1.1. Primary Sources

Primary data will be obtained from key informants; namely Bureaus, Zones and Woreda level officials and job performers. These respondents were selected because they do have irreplaceable role in fighting rent seeking and implementing institutional reform. Beside this, we took selected customers/citizens and stakeholders as key informants for the reason that they are the direct beneficiaries of the service delivered by the government institutions.

3.1.2. Secondary Sources

Secondary data sources like customer's opinion and compliant records, any reports related to rent seeking and other relevant documents was used. Published and unpublished materials also used to develop conceptual framework and to discuss review of related literatures that support the study.

3.2. Sampling Techniques and Procedures

Different sampling techniques were employed for selecting respondents. Out of the forty-one regional bureaus, commissions and agencies, seven of them were selected as a sample by using purposive sampling method. We took three performers, two management members and one top leader from each institution as a sample at regional level.

From eighteen zones, we took four purposively selected zones, three woredas was randomly sampled from each, and from each zone and woreda we took three performers, two management members and 1 top leader as a sample by using simple random sampling and availability sampling methodology respectively. Three customers were selected through accidental sampling method and participate on interview.

3.3. Instruments of Data Collection

In this study, different types of data collection tools will be used to obtain as accurate information as possible. These were questionnaires, interview, focus group discussion and document analysis.

3.3.1. Questionnaire

The questionnaire was used for management members and job performs at all levels. It was designed to get detailed information on the contribution of institutional reform tools implementation in combating rent seeking. Close ended and open-ended questions were included in the questionnaire. The questionnaire contains choice items, five-point scale rating items and ranking questions. The

employees and the management members to fill the questionnaire are pooled from finance and economic development, revenues, road, water mineral and energy, health, education and agriculture organization at all level.

3.3.2. Interviews

Interview was used to get in depth information about the issue understudy from top leader and customers/citizens of all institutions taken as a sample at all levels. The interview questions contain questions related to identification of major factors that contribute to the prevalence of rent seeking and its remedies used to overcome them.

3.3.3. Focus Group Discussion

Discussion was arranged with the sampled job performers at all levels to get insight on the contribution of reform tools implementation in fighting rent seeking. Moreover, possible solutions for problems or challenges that hinder its maximum contribution will be discussed with these groups. The participants of the focus group discussion were pooled from different core and support processes of the public institutions.

3.4. Document Analysis

A key document was thoroughly reviewed to obtain background information about the implementation of reform tools in institutions and its effectiveness. In addition, rent seeking documents, plans and implementation reports was examined.

3.5. Procedures of Data Collection

Once the pre-filed preparation was completed, with the letter of request for access to the concerned body of each institution, the formal contact was made. Along with this, the formal request for access to the relevant documents was made and secured on the first visit. Then the exact number of participants as per the sample size in each group was decided and the actual number of participants was determined.

Having done this on the second day of the visit an interview schedule was presented to the contact person and appointment for interview was made with the selected respondents. As per the appointment, the interview sessions were conducted. Besides, focus group discussion was held with the specified target groups as per the appointment set with the group.

After the necessary improvements were made the questionnaires were duplicated and distributed with the necessary orientations to be filled by the respondents.

Finally, out of 462 job performers to whom the questionnaires were distributed 370(80.1%) of them and out of 252 leaders 184(73%) of them successfully completed the questionnaire and returned.

3.6. Data Analysis and Presentation

Quantitative data obtained from the questionnaire was tabulated around the subtopics related to the research questions and descriptive statistics like percentages was used to indicate the extent of response or frequency per each item. Advanced statistical tools namely independent two independent samples Pearson chi-square test was employed to see whether or not there existed a difference between the responses given by leaders and job performers and those relationships were statistically significant or not. The questionnaire was coded and analyzed by using statistical package for social sciences (SPSS) program. The category of respondents in analysis was used as leaders (and job performers).

The qualitative data obtained from the documents and focus group discussion was transcribed, edited and organized around the subtopics derived from the research questions. Furthermore, the data from the interview, focus group discussions, open-ended questions, and documents were triangulated, checked against the quantitative ones and discussed. Besides this the findings were discussed and interpreted in relation to the relevant literature.

4. Data Analysis and Interpretation

This chapter presents, the data gathered from leaders and job performers by using questionnaire, interview and focus group discussions and from customers/citizens by using interview as data gathering tool. The data thus obtained were organized, tabulated, transcribed and analyzed to get findings.

4.1. Characteristics of the Respondents

Basic background information of the respondents in a study most of the time are considered as a determinant factor for the accomplishment of any type of study. Hence, the background information of the respondents of the study was analyzed and discussed in terms of their implication for implementation of institutional reform tools in combating rent seeking. The characteristics of respondents were summarized in the following table.

No	Variables	Characteristics	Respondents					
			Leaders		Performer		Total	
			N	%	N	%	N	%
1	Sex	Male	153	83.15	248	67.02	401	72.38
		Female	31	16.85	122	32.98	153	27.62
		Total	184	100.00	370	100.00	554	100.00
2	Age Category	18-30	59	32.06	156	42.16	215	38.81
		31-45	101	54.89	153	41.35	254	45.85
		Greater than 46	24	13.05	61	16.49	85	15.34
		Total	184	100.00	370	100.00	554	100.00

Table 1: Respondents' Distribution by Position, Sex and Age Category

As it can be seen from table 1, the majority of the respondents 401 (72.38%) were males while the remaining 153 (27.62%) were females. This implies that the overwhelming number of respondents were male. The main reason for the lower member of female respondents in this study goes to the historical gender disparity in the country in general and that of the region in particular. Concerning the age distribution of the respondents, the majority of them 215(38.81%) and 254(45.85%) fell in the range of 18-30 and 31-45 years respectively. This shows that under normal circumstances, they can express ideas related to the study consistently and with good understanding. Thus, their opinion can be taken as valuable idea to the study.

No	Variables	Characteristics	Respondents					
			Leaders		Performer		Total	
			N	%	N	%	N	%
1	Educational Level	Diploma and below	27	14.67	151	40.81	178	32.13
		BA/BSC/BED	104	56.52	163	44.05	267	48.19
		MA/MSC/MED	53	28.81	56	15.14	109	19.68
		PhD	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	184	100.00	370	100.00	554	100.00
2	Work Experience in years	1-5	35	19.02	83	22.43	118	21.30
		6-15	61	33.15	135	36.49	196	35.38
		Greater than 15	88	47.83	152	41.08	240	43.32
		Total	184	100.00	370	100.00	554	100.00

Table 2: Respondents' Distribution by Position, Educational Level and Work Experience

As depicted by table 2 the educational profile of the respondents, while the majority 267(48.19%) of them had BA/BSC/BED, the remaining 178(32.13%) and 109 (19.68%) had college diploma and MA/MSC/MED respectively. This means that in terms of educational profile in general terms the government institutions have the required level of education to implement different institutional reform tools. Moreover, the information they provide were more reliable and valid since they had the understanding about the benefit of institutional reform tools implementation in combating rent seeking.

In relation to work experience, the majority 240(43.32%) and 196(35.38%) of the respondents had worked for greater than 15 and 6-15 years respectively in their organization. This implies that the employees of these government institutions had adequate understanding of institutional reform tools that had been implemented in their respective institutions.

4.2. Analysis of Data on the Role of Institutional Reform Tools Implementation in Combating Rent Seeking

4.2.1. Awareness of Leaders, Job Performers & the Public about the Interrelation between Institutional Reform and Rent Seeking

Any institutional reform could not be conducted for the sake of reform only. Behind any institutional reform there is certain driving forces or pressure that pushes it to occur. In reality three factors (customer/citizens, competition and change) separately and in combination force an organization to undertake changes and these forces create a new world for work. To effectively and efficiently perform the institutional reform needed the people in the organization and the public has to get awareness what to be reformed in the institution. Among the three forces to change citizens got overhand to undertake change in governmental institution because its main objective is to save the public. To implement institutional reform in these institutions effectively it needs awareness from both sides. Furthermore, the people in the institutions and the public have to get awareness about the interrelation between rent seeking which may hinder effective service delivery and institutional reforms. In relation to this issue the value and believes that has to be installed in the new world is different from the old ones. It is developed from the awareness given through different methodology to shape the attitude of the people in the organization and the people at large.

The following table summarizes the response of the respondents on leaders, job performers and public awareness about the interrelation between institutional reforms and rent seeking.

No	Variables	Characteristics	Respondents					
			Leaders		Performer		Total	
			N	%	N	%	N	%
1	Leaders' awareness	Very Low	11	5.98	33	8.92	44	7.94
		Low	25	13.59	62	16.76	87	15.70
		Medium	102	55.43	186	50.27	288	51.99
		High	39	21.20	73	19.73	112	20.22
		Very High	7	3.80	16	4.32	23	4.15
	Total	184	100.00	370	100.00	554	100.00	
2	Employees' awareness	Very Low	7	3.80	19	5.14	26	4.69
		Low	20	10.87	53	14.32	73	13.18
		Medium	56	30.43	124	33.51	189	34.12
		High	88	47.83	133	35.95	212	38.27
		Very High	13	7.07	41	11.08	54	9.75
	Total	184	100.00	370	100.00	554	100.00	
3	Public awareness	Very Low	13	7.07	38	10.27	51	9.21
		Low	44	23.91	93	25.14	137	24.73
		Medium	73	39.67	128	34.59	201	36.28
		High	47	25.54	89	24.05	136	24.55
		Very High	7	3.80	22	5.95	29	5.23
	Total	184	100.00	370	100.00	554	100.00	

Table 3: Respondents' Rating of Level of Awareness on the Interrelation between Institutional Reform and Rent Seeking

As indicated in table 3 awareness of leaders, job performers and public about the interrelation between institutional reforms and rent seeking which can contribute to its reduction were rated by leaders and job performers. Accordingly, majority of the respondents revealed that leaders and public awareness about the interrelation of institutional reform tools and rent seeking was medium. This implies that both of them have the preliminary knowledge of institutional reform benefits for the public institutions. It is to mean that there is no in depths know how one can affect the other. On the other hand, the majority of leaders 88(47.83%)and job performers 133(35.95%) confirmed that job performers awareness about their interrelation was high. This implies that job performers have expertise knowledge about what we mean by institutional reforms and its impact on their institution. Moreover, they do have the potential to understand their interrelation since they are implementing the reform tools in their respective organization.

Moreover, from focus group discussion and opinion in open ended questions it was indicated that there is knowledge gap about the concept of institutional reform tools and rent seeking from the part of leaders. This implies that their understanding about the interrelation between them is weak. Thus, it is safe to conclude that lack of awareness on the part of the public and leaders is one of the challenges that hinder its maximum contribution in the rent seeking campaign.

4.2.2. Institutional Reform Tools Elements and their Contribution in Combating Rent Seeking

Institutional reform is undertaken to take the organization where it has to be to meet the needs and expectation of the citizens' and stakeholders. On the other hand, rent seeking behavior and practice is an obstacle for the effectiveness of public institutions. In line with this concept Andrew Wedeman (2004) pointed out that some attributes of rent seeking in many developing countries are characterized by poor implementation of institutional reforms and weak institutional settings. There is also the possibility that the existence of various rent seeking groups took strategic advantage of resisting reforms and implemented rent seeking delays and setbacks. On one hand, realizing institutional reforms enhance transparency and accountability in public institutions. The following table summarizes institutional reform tools elements and their contribution in combating rent seeking.

No	Variables	Characteristics	Respondents					
			Leaders		Performer		Total	
			N	%	N	%	N	%
1	Work flow designed by BPR	Very Low	5	2.72	15	4.05	20	3.61
		Low	17	9.24	40	10.81	57	10.29
		Medium	78	42.39	173	46.76	251	45.31
		High	71	38.59	113	30.54	184	33.21
		Very High	13	7.07	29	7.84	42	7.58
		Total	184	100.00	370	100.00	554	100.00
2	Employee's empowerment in public organization	Very Low	8	4.35	32	8.65	40	7.22
		Low	30	16.30	60	16.22	90	16.25
		Medium	56	30.43	150	40.54	206	37.18
		High	67	36.41	99	26.76	166	29.96
		Very High	23	12.50	29	7.84	52	9.39
		Total	184	100.00	370	100.00	554	100.00
3	Civil service change army	Very Low	5	2.72	17	4.59	22	3.97
		Low	25	13.59	54	14.59	79	14.26
		Medium	84	45.65	163	44.05	247	44.58
		High	58	31.52	105	28.38	163	29.42
		Very High	12	6.52	31	8.38	43	7.76
		Total	184	100.00	370	100.00	554	100.00
4	One stop shopping service delivery	Very Low	5	2.72	13	3.51	18	3.25
		Low	15	8.15	58	15.68	73	13.18
		Medium	70	38.04	153	41.35	223	40.25
		High	75	40.76	114	30.81	189	34.12
		Very High	19	10.33	32	8.65	51	9.21
		Total	184	100.00	370	100.00	554	100.00

Table 4: Respondents Rating of Institutional Reform Tools Elements and their Contribution in Combating Rent Seeking

As indicated in table 4 the majority of leaders revealed that the redesigned work flow by business process reengineering and one stop shopping service delivery system 78(42.39%) and 75(40.76%) respectively contributed a lot in combating rent seeking. In addition to this they revealed that civil service change army and employee empowerment in public institutions 84(45.65%) &67(36.41%) also played their role in fighting rent seeking. On the other hand, the majority of job performers also confirmed that redesigned work flow by business process reengineering, employee empowerment one stop shopping service delivery system and civil service change army contributed a lot in combating rent seeking. As it is depicted in the table both of the respondents rated the contribution of institutional reform tools elements as medium. This implies that they contributed their part for the campaign on rent seeking.

Informants on the focus group discussion and interview also pointed out the contribution of institutional reform tools elements as they played their role in developing accountability system, making the service delivery transparent, developing team spirit, etc. These all have the role in combating rent seeking in public institutions. Moreover, customers/citizens also indicated their contribution as it is a stepping stone for the expected result. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that these elements have contribution on anti-rent seeking campaign as the initial effort but they need more commitment to contribute in its fullest sense.

4.2.3. Challenges of Institutional Reform Tools in Combating Rent Seeking

Ethiopia as a developing country has a transformation agenda spanning over decades. This agenda has gone through number of phases in response to a growing awareness that pervasive deficits in capacity have hampered, the ability of the state to secure the fundamentals of poverty reduction and democratic development including responsive service delivery, citizen empowerment and good government (Ministry of Capacity Building in Getachew and Common, 2005).

In transforming public institutions implementation of institutional reform tools play a great role. To do this there should be a fertile ground for its effectiveness. Table 5 summarizes the response of leaders and job performs on challenges of institutional reform tools in combating rent seeking.

No	Variables	Characteristics	Respondents						Pearson chi-square	Sig.(2tailed)
			Leaders		Performer		Total			
			N	%	N	%	N	%		
1	Low level of leaders' commitment	Highly disagree	8	4.35	36	9.73	44	7.94	16.57	.002
		Disagree	16	8.70	44	11.89	60	10.83		
		Neutral	40	21.74	95	25.68	135	24.37		
		Agree	68	36.96	82	22.16	150	27.08		
		Highly agree	52	28.26	113	30.54	165	29.78		
Total		184	100.00	370	100.00	554	100.00			
2	Low level of performers' commitment	Highly disagree	7	3.80	24	6.49	31	5.60	5.158	.271
		Disagree	19	10.33	53	14.32	72	13.00		
		Neutral	51	27.72	110	29.73	161	29.06		
		Agree	63	34.24	104	28.11	167	30.14		
		Highly agree	44	23.91	79	21.35	123	22.20		
Total		184	100.00	370	100.00	554	100.00			
3	Professional indiscipline/unethical behavior	Highly disagree	2	1.09	20	5.41	22	3.97	9.04	.060
		Disagree	18	9.78	30	8.11	48	8.66		
		Neutral	39	21.20	60	16.22	99	17.87		
		Agree	69	37.50	158	42.70	227	40.97		
		Highly agree	56	30.43	102	27.57	158	28.52		
Total		184	100.00	370	100.00	554	100.00			
4	Lack of accountability for public institutions officials	Highly disagree	5	2.72	16	4.32	21	3.79	4.417	.352
		Disagree	16	8.70	31	8.38	47	8.48		
		Neutral	43	23.37	66	17.84	109	19.68		
		Agree	60	32.61	112	30.27	172	31.05		
		Highly agree	60	32.61	145	39.19	205	37.00		
Total		184	100.00	370	100.00	554	100.00			

Table 5: Respondents Rating of Challenges in Combating Rent Seeking

As depicted in table 5 above the challenges of institutional reform tools in combating rent seeking were rated by leaders and job performers. Accordingly, both leaders and job performers rated low leader's commitment, low job performs commitment, professional's unethical behavior and lack of accountability for public institutions officials and the civil servants as major challenges. This implies that the problem was well understood by both respondents. Therefore, the need to find strategies to alleviate these challenges will be the common agenda for leader's job performers and at large the citizens.

A Pearson chi-square was done to reveal the agreement level of the two groups of respondents. The result obtained revealed that, with the exception of item 1,2, degree of freedom at 95 percent confidence interval, the associated P-values were found to be greater than 0,05 implying that there was an agreement between the responses given by the respondents of the two groups. Hence, the challenges identified as major were well recognized throughout the institutions.

Nevertheless, there still remains a lot to change the old way of thinking. The opinion of leaders and job performers showed difference in indicating reality about leaders' low commitment. It is indicated in the table that Pearson chi-square value was 16.57 and its P-value (0.002) was less than 0.05. In this case there was statistically significant difference in perception regarding leaders' commitment. This implies that there was problem of transparency from leaders' side which affects the effectiveness of the change.

According to key informant's successful implementation of institutional reform needs both leaders and job performer's commitment. Both had low commitment to change their organization towards its end goal. To achieve this end goal, they have tackle tent seeking through reform tools implementation. Furthermore, they indicate that to meet citizens need and requirement public institutions have to prevent the behavior /attitude and practices of tent seeking implementing institutional reforms to alleviate their strategic problems from its grass root. Besides, professional unethical problem and loose accountability of officials and civil servants were indicated as the major challenges.

Empowerment of job performs primarily includes capacitating of the concerned experts, without capacitating them empowerment couldn't meet its objective. The difference in opinion between the responses given by the two respondent groups night originate from the fact that leaders were tempered to exaggerate their performance in this regard, as if they empowered their job performance. But, the reality was not in its real sensor.

A Pearson chi-square test was calculated to check whether perceptual difference exists between the two groups of respondents Accordingly, the result revealed that, for 2 degrees of freedoms at 95% confidence interval, except for items 2 the associated P-values were food to be greater than 0.05 implying that there is no statistically significant difference in perception regarding the responses given to the items 1, 2, 3, and 4. On the other hand, for item 2 the associated P- values was found to be less than 0.05 implying that there was a statistically significant difference between the responses given by two respondent groups. The difference in the opinion between the two groups of respondents might have seen aroused form the fact that leaders seen to be hesitant.

4.2.4. The Status of Rent Seeking as a Result of Institutional Reform tools Implementation in Public Institutions.

The impact of rent seeking is a clear failure to achieve government objectives; instead producing inefficiency and waste (Mauro, 2002). Public institutions are undertaking institutional reforms so as to achieve their objectives. Its implementation contributes to alleviate institutional obstacles that linders their effectiveness. The following table summarizes the response of respondents on the status of rent seeking attitude/behavior and practices as a result of institutional reform tools implementation in public institutions.

No	Items		Respondent's organizational position						Pearson chi-square	Sig.(2-tailed)
			Leaders		Performer		Total			
			N	%	N	%	N	%		
1	Prevalence of rent seeking attitude/Behavior	Reduced	37	20.11	45	12.16	82	14.80	13.098	0.004
		Relatively reducing	116	63.04	218	58.92	334	60.29		
		Not reduced	27	14.67	88	23.78	115	20.76		
		I do not know	4	2.18	19	5.14	23	4.15		
	Total	184	100.00	370	100.00	554	100.00			
2	Prevalence of rent seeking practice	Reduced	48	26.09	67	18.11	115	20.76	17.984	0.000
		Relatively reducing	111	60.33	194	52.43	305	55.05		
		Not reduced	20	10.87	89	24.05	109	19.68		
		I do not know	5	2.71	20	5.41	25	4.51		
	Total	184	100.00	370	100.00	554	100.00			

Table 6: Respondents Rating of the Status of Rent Seeking as a Result of Institutional Reform Tools Implementation in Public Institutions

As shown in table 6 the respondents rated the status of rent seeking behavior/Attitude as a result of institutional reforms undertaken in public institutions. Both groups of respondents confirmed that rent seeking behavior and practices were relatively reducing as a result of institutional reform tools implementation in public institutions. This implies that the implantation of the tools contributed to some extent to combat rent seeking.

The result of person chi-square test reveals that, at 95 percent confidence interval, the associated p-values were found to be less than 0.05 (P-values 0.004 and 0.000) implying that there was statistically significant difference between the opinions of the two groups of respondents. The difference in the opinion between the two groups of respondents might have been aroused from the fact that leaders seen to exaggerate beyond its real contributions as it obviously falls under their responsibility to make institutional reform effective in order to satisfy citizens need and requirement.

Moreover, from focus group discussion and opinion in open ended questions it was indicated that institutional reform tools implementation contributed a lot to develop transparent service delivery system and to change the value and beliefs of the people in the institutions and to change the value and beliefs of the people in the institutions and the citizens at large. Besides, it played its role to develop accountability system but as key informants revealed that its enforcement was loose. They also confirmed that as a result of institutional reform the citizens were becoming progress in developing know how about their right on public institutions and their stake in the achievements of their objective. Thus, institutional reforms contributed a lot through not as expected by the citizens.

5. Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter presents the summary of major findings of the study, the conclusion drawn based on the major findings and recommendations that represent the points proposed based on the conclusion.

5.1. Summary

This research is planned and carried out to find answers to the following research questions.

1. To what extent the implementation of reform tools has contributed to combat rent-seeking?
2. What are the major challenges of institutional reform tools implementation in combating rent seeking?
3. How can we alleviate the pitfalls that encounter reform in combating rent seeking?

By answering the aforementioned research questions, the study attempts to examine the extent to which the implementation of reform tools has contributed in combating rent-seeking by creating awareness about the interrelation between institutional reform tools implementation and rent seeking among leaders, job performers and citizens. The study also attempts to identify the major challenges related to institutional reform tools implementation in combating rent seeking and strategies to alleviate the challenges.

5.1.1. Characteristics of the Respondents

1. The majority of the respondents 401 (72.38%) were males while the remaining 153 (27.62%) were females.
2. The majority of them 215(38.81%) and 254(45.85%) fell in the range of 18-30 and 31-45 years respectively.
3. The majority of the respondents 267(48.19%) had BA/BSC/BED, the remaining 178(32.13%) and 109 (19.68%) had college diploma and MA/MSC/MED respectively.
4. The majority 240(43.32%) and 196(35.38%) of the respondents had worked for greater than 15 and 6-15 years respectively in their organization.

5.1.2. Major Findings

The major findings are organized according to the basic questions. Accordingly, institutional reform tools contribution in combating rent seeking, its challenges and strategies in place to alleviate them were the major areas under which they are organized.

5.1.2.1. Institutional Reform Tools Contribution in Combating Rent Seeking

1. The majority of leaders (63.04 % & 60.33%) and job performers (58.92 % & 52.43 %) pointed out that as the result of institutional reform tools implementation the attitude/behavior and practice of rent seeking were relatively reduced.
2. The majority of key informants revealed that institutional reform tools implementation played a key role in ensuring transparency, in initiating the transformation of value and belief of the civil servant and developing the awareness of citizens and stakeholders about their right and obligation in receiving public institutions service. Thus, to some extent it contributes in fighting rent seeking in public institutions.
3. The majority of leaders and job performers revealed that the redesigning of work flow and one-stop-shopping service delivery system developed through BPR, team work and coordination spirit advanced through the formation of Development Army have contributed a lot in combating rent seeking.
4. The majority of key informants indicated the implementation of institutional reform tools enhanced public institutions service delivery by eliminating handoffs and non-value adding tasks which in turn contribute in combating rent seeking attitude and practice.

5.1.2.2. Challenges of Institutional Reform Tools in Combating Rent Seeking

1. Both group of respondents revealed that the awareness of leaders, civil servants and the citizens on the contribution of institutional reform tools implementation in combating rent seeking was low.
2. The majority of key informants indicated that training of awareness creation on the benefits of institutional reform tools implementation in combating rent seeking was not satisfactory.
3. Leaders and job performers pointed out that low commitment and unethical behaviors among professionals as well as loose accountability system and loose follow up and monitoring were the major challenges of institutional reform tools' contribution in combating rent seeking.
4. The majority of key informants indicated that resistance to institutional reform tools implementation and leadership focus problem were also the challenges that hinder its contribution in fighting rent seeking.

5.1.2.3. Strategies in Place to Alleviate the Challenges

1. The majority of key informants revealed that awareness creation training for leaders, job performers and the public at large about the contribution of institutional reform tools in combating rent seeking was not provided among the mechanisms/strategies in place to alleviate challenges in BPR implementation creating a sense of urgency and reinforcing change were not used.
2. The majority of key informants pointed out that the coordination among different public institutions especially Civil Service and Good Governance Bureau and Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission to tackle the challenges was loose.

5.2. Conclusions

This study was conducted to assess the challenges and prospects of institutional reform tools implementation in combating rent-seeking in public institutions in Oromia Regional State so as to indicate possible remedies for the identified challenges. It was concerned with the extent to which the implementation of reform tools has contributed in combating rent-seeking by creating awareness about the interrelation between institutional reform tools implementation and rent seeking among leaders, job performers and citizens. On top of this the study also identifies the major challenges related to institutional reform tools implementation in combating rent seeking and mechanisms/strategies in place to alleviate the challenges. Therefore, pertaining to the findings deduced from the study, the following conclusions were drawn.

The study reveals that the awareness of leaders, civil servants and the citizens on the contribution of institutional reform tools implementation in combating rent seeking was low. It also shows that training of awareness creation on the benefits of institutional reform tools implementation in combating rent seeking was not satisfactory. On the other hand, the study indicates that the redesigning of work flow and one-stop-shopping service delivery system developed through BPR, team work and coordination spirit advanced through the formation of Development Army have contributed a lot in combating rent seeking.

Low commitment and unethical behaviors among professionals as well as loose accountability system and loose follow up and monitoring, and resistance to institutional reform tools implementation were found to be the major challenges of institutional reform tools' contribution in combating rent seeking.

Therefore, it can be safely concluded that unless proper awareness creation training program for leaders, job performers and the public at large on the contribution of institutional reform tools implementation in combating rent seeking is provided at all administrative tier and appropriate measures and strategies are timely taken and in place the challenges encountered institutional reform tools implementation in fighting rent seeking impede the effectiveness and efficiency of public institutions. The contribution of institutional reform tools implementation in combating rent seeking was promising and the challenges explored by this study emanated from lack of adequate conceptual understanding, technical skills, and lack of real experiences about their interrelation on the part of leaders and job performers of public institutions.

5.3. Recommendations

Based on the findings of the study and the conclusions drawn the following recommendations have been forwarded so as to augment the contribution of institutional reform tools in combating rent seeking:

1. The study recommends all the concerned institutions especially the Public Service and Human Development Bureau and Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission to develop different communication strategies like conducting workshops, training, seminars, as well as preparing and distributing pamphlets, notices, head letters, memos and business cards in order to create common or shared understanding on the benefit/contribution of institutional reform tools implementation in fighting rent seeking among leaders, service providers (performers) and the citizens at large at all administrative tier of the region.
2. Fighting rent seeking is not only the government agenda and couldn't be effective alone. It needs nationwide campaign to fight rent seeking mentality and practice, enhancing public awareness and garnering its active participation must be the central point of its focus and effort. Therefore, the Civil Service Reform job performer and Ethics Officer in the public institutions should cooperate to direct the active participation towards its intended objective attainment. Moreover, they have to work for the establishment of broad ownership of reforms by creating strong partnerships with civil society and the private sector; and making rent seeking 'high risk' and 'low profit'.
3. The study recommends that further studies should be conducted so as to uncover further problems and come up with possible solutions with regard to the issue under study.

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