Refine your search
Collections
Co-Authors
Year
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z All
Varma, Veer S.
- The Impact of Audit Committee Appointment and Reporting Arrangements on Audit Committees' Independence
Abstract Views :226 |
PDF Views:0
Authors
Affiliations
1 School of Accounting and Finance, University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji Islands.
1 School of Accounting and Finance, University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji Islands.
Source
Journal of Commerce and Accounting Research, Vol 1, No 3 (2012), Pagination: 8-16Abstract
This study investigates impact of audit committee appointment and reporting arrangements on audit committees' independence in resolving auditor-management disputes. Corporate governance is one of the critical issues in business today. Corporate governance practice provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, the means of attaining those objectives are met and monitoring the performance of the companies is determined. Amongst the many branches of corporate governance, the financial reporting system is one which closely relates to the concept of corporate governance and accountability. The effect of sound corporate governance practices on the quality of financial reporting has recently received attention from many researchers, particularly in the U.S. (McMullen, 1996; Beasley et al., 2000; Abbott et al., 2000). In order to gain confidence in the organizations around the world, corporations must provide users with relevant, reliable and timely information in order to enhance the quality and integrity of the financial reporting process. (Imhoff, 2003).The role of auditing in the corporate governance structure is essential in the flow of quality information to the market participants. However, the governance literature has only just begun to consider the role of the audit as a component governance device (Anderson et al. 1993). Such a role emerged during the early 20th century when shareholders appointed representatives such as the board of directors, who serve their interests in the corporations. There responsibilities were to look out for the interests of the owners and to oversee the management of the entity. As part of their refinement process, these boards eventually added 'audit committees' as one of their sub-committees to address some of the more sensitive governance issues in these corporations.
Keywords
Audit Committee, Corporate Governance, Auditor-management Dispute
References
- Abbott, L. J., Park, Y. & Parker, S. (2000). The Effects of Audit Committee Activity and Independence on Corporate Fraud. Managerial Finance, 26 (11), pp. 55-67.
- Abbott, L. J., Parker, S. & Peters, G. F. (2000). The Effectiveness of Blue Ribbon Committee Recommendations in Mitigating Financial Misstatements: An Empirical Study. Working Paper, (Draft 1.1/November 2000), Santa Clara University.
- Anderson, D., Francis, J. R. & Stokes, D. J. (1993). Auditing, Directorships and the Demand for Monitoring. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 12, pp. 353-375.
- Beasley, M. S. (1996). An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud. The Accounting Review, October, pp. 443-466.
- Beasley, M. S., Carcello, J. V. & Hermanson, D. R. (1999). Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997, An Analysis of US Public Companies. Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, New York, NY: COSO.
- Beasley, M. S., Carcello, J. V., Hermanson, D. R. & Lapides, P. D. (2000). Fraudulent Financial Reporting: Consideration of Industry Traits and Corporate Governance Mechanisms. Accounting Horizons, December, pp. 441-454.
- Bull, I. & Sharp, F. C. (1989). Advising Clients on Treadway Audit Committee Recommendations. Journalof Accountancy, February, pp. 46-52.
- Cadbury. (1992). Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (pp. 25-35). London: Gee and Co.
- Chow, C. W. & Rice, S. J. (1982). Qualified Audit Opinions and Auditor Switching. The Accounting Review, 57, pp. 326-335.
- Cohen Commission. (1978). Report of the Commission on Auditors Responsibilities. AICPA.
- Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G. & Sweeney, A. P. (1996). Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 13, pp. 1-36.
- DeFond, M. K. & Jiambalvo. (1991). Incidence and Circumstances of Accounting Errors. The Accounting Review, July, pp. 643-655.
- DeZoort, F. T. (1998). An Analysis of Experience Effects on Audit Committee Members Oversight Judgments. Accounting, Organisations and Society, 23(1), pp. 1-21.
- DeZoort, F. T. & Salterio, S. E. (2001). The Effects of Corporate Governance Experience and Financial-Reporting and Audit Knowledge on Audit Committee Members’ Judgments. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 20(2).
- Dhaliwal, D. S., Schatzberg, J. W. & Trombley, M. A. S. (1993). An Analysis of the Economic Factors Related to Auditor-Client Disagreements Preceding Auditor Changes. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Fall, pp. 22-38.
- Fama, E. & Jensen, M. (1983). Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26, pp. 301-325.
- Forker, J. & Green, S. (2000). Corporate Governance and Accounting Models of the Reporting Entity. British Accounting Review, 32, pp. 375-396.
- GAO (General Accounting Office). (1991). Audit Committees: Legislation Needed to Strengthen Bank Oversight (pp. 46-84). Washington, D. C.: Report to Congressional Committees.
- Haka, S. & Chalos, P. (1990). Evidence of Agency Conflict among Management, Auditors and the Audit Committee Chair. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 9, pp. 271-292.
- Herdman, R. & Neary, R. (1988). Can the AICPA Close the Expectations Gap with New Standards? Financial Executive, March/April, pp. 9-12.
- Imhoff, E. A. (2003). Accounting Quality, Auditing, and Corporate Governance. Accounting Horizons. Supplement, pp. 117-128.
- Jensen, M. C. & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), pp. 305-360.
- Kalbers, L. P. & Fogarty, T. J. (1993). Audit Committee Effectiveness: An Empirical Investigation of the Contribution of Power. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 12(1), pp. 24-49.
- Knapp, M. C. (1987). An Empirical Study of Audit Committee Support for Auditors Involved in Technical Disputes with Client Management. The Accounting Review, July, pp. 578-588.
- Kolton, P. (1988). The Treadway Commission-What Happens Next? Financial Executive, May/June Issue, pp. 50-55.
- Korn/Ferry International. (2000). Annual Board of Directors’ Study. New York, NY: Korn/Ferry International.
- Marsh, H. L. & Powell, T. E. (1989). The Audit Committee Charter: Rx for Fraud Prevention. Journal of Accountancy, February, pp. 55-57.
- McInnes, W. (1993). Auditing into the Twenty-first Century, A Discussion Document by the Research Committee of The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland. Edinburgh: The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland.
- McMullen, D. A. (1996). Audit Committee Performance: An Investigation of the Consequences Associated with Audit Committees. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Spring, pp. 87-103.
- O’Sullivan, N. (2000). The Impact of Board Composition and Ownership on Audit Quality: Evidence from Large UK Companies. British Accounting Review, 32, pp. 397-414.
- Parker, S. (2000). The Association Between Audit Committee Characteristics and the Conservatism of Financial Reporting. Paper Presented at the American Accounting Association 2000 Annual Conference.
- Peasnell, K. V., Pope, P. F. & Young, S. (1999). Characteristics of Firms Subject to Adverse Financial Reporting Review Panel Rulings. Paper Presented at the Financial Accounting and Auditing Research Conference, July. SOAS, University of London.
- POB (Public Oversight Board of the SEC Practice Section). (1993). In the Public Interest: Issues Confronting the Accounting Profession. Stamford: AICPA.
- Rosenstein, S. & Wyatt, J. G. (1990). Outside Directors, Board Independence and Shareholder Wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, 26, pp.175-191.
- Scarbrough, P., Rama, D. & Raghunandan, K. (1998). Audit Committee Composition and Interaction with Internal Auditing: Canadian Evidence. Accounting Horizons, March, pp. 51-62.
- Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A Survey of Corporate Governanc., The Journal of Finance, June, pp. 737-783.
- Solomon, J. F., Solomon, A., Norton, D. & Joseph, N. L. (2000). A Conceptual Framework for Corporate Risk Disclosure Emerging from the Agenda for CorporateGovernance Reform. British Accounting Review, 32, pp. 447-478.
- Treadway Commission. (1987). Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
- Uecker, W. C., Brief, A. P. & Kinney, Jr. W. R. (1981). Perception of the Internal and External Auditor as a Deterrent to Corporate Irregularities. The Accounting Review, 56(3).
- Weschler, D. (1989). Giving the Watchdog Fangs. Forbes, November, pp. 103-133.
- Westphal, J. D. & Zajac, E. J. (1995). Who Shall Govern? CEO/board Power, Demographic Similarity and New Director Selection. Administrative Science Quarterly, pp. 60-83.
- Westphal, J. D. & Zajac, E. J. (1997). Defections from the Inner Circle: Social Exchange, Reciprocity and the Diffusion of Board Independence in the U.S. Corporations. Administrative Science Quarterly, pp. 161-183.
- Windram, B. & Song, J. (2000). The Effectiveness of Audit Committees: Evidence from UK Companies in the Post-Cadbury Period. Paper Presented at the British Accounting Association Annual Conference, UK: University of Exeter.
- Wolnizer, P. W. (1995). Are Audit Committees Red Herrings? Abacus, 31, pp. 45-66.
- Zajac, E. J. & Westphal, J. D. (1996). Who Shall Succeed? How CEO/board Preferences and Power Affect the Choice of New CEOs. Academy of Management Journal, pp. 64-90.
- Zaman, M. (2002). Globalization of Corporate Governance: An Alternative Framework for Conceptualising Innovation and Effects. Corporate Governance Framework, January.