

The Idea of the System of Philosophy in Hegel's Works

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Abstract

The article presents an integrated reconstruction of Hegel's philosophy, in the process of which the place and the function of the thinker's major conceptual constructions are established. During problem solving the key role of the concept of infinity in Hegel's philosophy is proved and the importance of The Phenomenology of Spirit in the system of philosophy is revealed. Until now, Science of Logic as the first element of the encyclopedic system often has been the subject of analysis for the researchers who were trying to understand the structure of the Hegelian system. The Phenomenology of Spirit, by contrast, was usually considered beyond Hegelian system projects as a "separate" ("early") work. The analysis of systemic importance of The Phenomenology of Spirit involves identifying the specificity of the phenomenological thingness and the description of its structure. For the first time in the world of historical and philosophical literature the analysis of its own structure of The Phenomenology of Spirit is carried out based on the concept of "true infinity", herewith in accordance with the specificity of phenomenological experience subject there are three phenomenological narrative "circles". Reconstruction of the process of formation in the course of the phenomenological movement of speculative thingness ending with the "infinity" as an adequate expression of its structure allows revealing the principle of the philosophical knowledge organization in the system of Hegel's philosophy and determining the attitude of Logic to actual philosophy, that is, solving the main problem of the "encyclopedic system". The article also presents the analysis of Science of Logic in terms of how it describes the process of "implementation" ("deepening") of speculative thingness, thus outlining the main stages of the method evolution in Logic motion.

Keywords: Concept of "True Infinity", Hegel's Philosophy, Phenomenology of Spirit, Science of Logic, Structure of Philosophy System

1. Introduction

Hegel's philosophy has been traditionally viewed as a systematic philosophy, as a "system of philosophy". The thinker understood his philosophy so by himself declaring in the preface to *The Phenomenology of Spirit* that true philosophy must exist as the form of a scientific system, and presenting his work as the "first part" of *System of Science* in accordance with it. However, the question of what are the elements of the system of philosophy established by Hegel and the relationship between them still remains open.

In Hegel's researches a three-part sequence "Logic – Philosophy of Nature – The Philosophy of Spirit" that was

presented in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences* is usually meant by the "system of philosophy", so "system of philosophy" is identified with "encyclopedic system". At that *The Phenomenology of Spirit* is considered only as the first draft of "mature" system of philosophy or a historical introduction to the system, but anyway not as an independent element. Most contemporary historians of philosophy, studying the evolution of the Hegelian thought, suppose that a certain "gap" in the philosopher's systems thinking, marking the transition to a new model of building a system of philosophy took place between the idea of *System of Science*, in the context of which *The Phenomenology of Spirit* was created, and the idea of *Encyclopedia*.

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Historical and conceptual foundations of this understanding of the evolution of Hegelian systematic thought are well known and seem to be very convincing. However, the central problem of encyclopedic system – the problem of the relation of subjects of Logic and the real philosophy (Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Spirit) or logical idea and the world – is unsolvable within the boundaries of the encyclopedic system. Meanwhile, not only the integrated reconstruction of Hegel's philosophy, but also an understanding of one or another of its particulars is fated to be problematic as long as the principle possibilities of solving problem of relation of logic and real philosophy are not studied.

Discussing systemic problems in Hegel's work, one should bear in mind that the study of the structure of Hegel's philosophy in the history and philosophy of 19-20th centuries was complicated by several factors. So, while the idea of systematicity remained one of the dominant ideas of Hegel's world view throughout the philosopher's creative life, its specific content was almost continuously changing. And as adequate representation of evolution of Hegel's views on this issue is the basis for understanding the subsequent history of the study of the problem relating to the structure of Hegel's philosophy (all interpreters inevitably adhered to different characteristics of the system of philosophy which were given by its author), it is necessary to identify the main stages of the evolution of Hegel's ideas about the structure of his system of philosophy:

The first stage is the early one, before Hegel began to work on *The Phenomenology of Spirit*; at this stage Hegel's views often and dramatically changed; the study of texts referring to this period in the context of the stated topic consideration is just of a "historical" interest; they demonstrate the philosopher's creative character becoming, however, not approaching the discovery of its true foundation and the "secret", its "truth".

The second stage is the mature one, taking the time of work over *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Science of Logic* that implemented the *System of Science* project. In the present research that image of the philosophy system is reconstructed, which corresponds to the content of exactly these works – the only theoretical treatises by Hegel created as a free expression, independent of external circumstances and adequate by shape to Hegelian basic intuitions, of at last found "truth" due to all his former philosophical and ideological searches.

The third period is the later one, during which a

three-part sequence of the encyclopedic system appears in the foreground formed not only as a result of the philosopher's scientific research, but also as a result of his long-term educational working. Gradual oblivion of *The Phenomenology* and replication of *Logic* made on its basis as the first part of *Encyclopedia* created mainly in the educational working process in the context of the proposed concept of historical and philosophical studies are understood as a process of degradation of the project of philosophy system emerged in Jena period.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Review of Hegel's Philosophy in the Classical Hegel Studies

A new context of Hegel's philosophy perception, which further complicated the task of understanding its systematic structure was the philosopher's collection of works¹, compiled and published through the efforts of his disciples and followers. As the result of implementation of this project the roles that didn't belong to the Hegelian works in the historical evolution of Hegel's views were assigned to these works. This situation was unfavorable, especially for the understanding of its core part, theoretical core expressed in the form of two treatises, the content of which decomposed in the environment of textbooks alien to genuine philosophy and lecture notes made by Hegel's students. As a result, *The Phenomenology* and *Logic* were presented or as "ordinary" components of the "system" or as "stages" of the philosopher's systemic thought evolution.

One of the first fundamental critics of encyclopedic system was Schelling². By the middle of the 19th century the criticism of Hegel's philosophy had become a defining attribute of European philosophical literature. It comes from both the Hegelian school and from the new philosophical movements. As a form the criticism of Hegel's philosophy, the philosophy of a new era, in fact, said goodbye to the classical philosophy in general and the most distant from the interests and needs of this era, of course, was exactly the theoretical basis of Hegel's philosophy – *The Phenomenology* and *Logic*. Understanding of the "system" as "a sum of elements" corresponds to the spirit of that time, and *Encyclopedia*, extended by the issued lecture courses, is well suited to this role, although, of course, no longer able to cause any sympathy of philosophical community.

However, at the same time in some of European countries again the interest arises to Hegel's philosophy, although it didn't extend to the question of the systematic structure of Hegel's philosophy. The "System" as a form of unity and integrity of Hegel's thoughts didn't spark any interest not only in critics of Hegel, but in the neo-Hegelian movement, because the content of Hegel's philosophy was often used by them to solve their own, far from the actual meaning of the Hegelian philosophy, issues. Only in the 20th century French Neo-Hegelians referred to *The Phenomenology of Spirit* as Hegel's key work. And despite the fact that the interpretation of *The Phenomenology* proposed by J. Wahl and A. Kojève, were extremely arbitrary, despite the fact that both authors were far from thought to see in *The Phenomenology* the key to understanding Hegel's system (and that is the task of modern investigation of the structure of Hegel's philosophy), however, the very concerned reading of this work opening its principled irreducibility to encyclopedic system played a role in attracting the attention of researchers to the problem of systematic structure of Hegel's philosophy.

2.2 The study of Hegel's Philosophy in Russia

In Russia the perception of Hegel's ideas began during the life of the philosopher and had a rich history. The educated Russian society paid attention to Hegel and other German philosophers at the time of the rise of German philosophy. And later the interest in Hegel played a significant role in the development of philosophy and humanities in Russia as well. At the same time, however, "passion for Hegel" for the Russian authors in most cases was a kind of common mentality, which didn't deepen into the details of Hegel's thought. The interests of Hegel's Russian listeners and readers rarely spread on properly theoretical component of his philosophy; it was impossible to find self-reflection on the structure of Hegel's philosophy in Russian literature of 19 – early 20th centuries.

Even in works by I. A. Ilyin³, who is well acquainted with both the Hegelian texts and the critical literature of his time, we do not find a direct statement of a question about the structure of Hegel's philosophy. Although conversance with the work by I. A. Ilyin is important for modern researchers of the system of philosophy of Hegel, because Hegel's philosophy appears crowded with dramatic collisions in it and, therefore, objectively, I. A. Ilyin encourages the reader to attempt to figure the

structure of the Hegelian system by themselves, specifically the question of the structure of Hegel's philosophy hadn't been put in it.

In the Marxist Soviet literature on Hegel that literally reproduced the theories of Marx and Engels made (and often at a very special occasion) a century ago, the "system" as a "conservative" aspect of Hegel's philosophy was opposed to "the method" ("dialectics") as a "progressive" "revolutionary" aspect of it. In such circumstances, it would be just weird to find a special interest in Hegel's system in the literature. The only significant exception is the work by K. S. Bakradze⁴. K. S. Bakradze sees three "realities" "complementary" to each other and equal in status and significance, three moments or aspects of the absolute; respectively in the logical idea, the nature and the spirit, he is convinced that we need to see three forms of comprehension, three images of a single absolute in three parts of *Encyclopedia* as well. On the one hand, this view of Hegel's system is the result of understanding that Logic and real philosophy do not constitute a sequence to which the *Encyclopedia* scheme artificially forces them, but, on the other hand, however, we cannot accept these three "realities" of the Hegelian universe and their reflection in the "science" as merely indifferent towards each other as well. The "system" as an internal relationship of "realities" and "sciences" is hiding in K. S. Bakradze's work behind the forced recognition of the value of each of them for understanding the Hegelian thought.

2.3 The Problem of Systematic Structure of Hegel's Philosophy in the Modern Hegel Studies

From the middle of the 20th century the situation with the study of Hegel's philosophy essentially changed. The place of "interpretations" in which Hegel's philosophy often played the role of a tool (or even just a pretext) to solve the author's own theoretical problems, are taken by researches, oriented toward receiving "credible" information about the Hegelian philosophy. However, how can this commendable but very difficult idea be realized? International and, above all, the German historical and philosophic science avoids to henceforth nominate "unreasonable" judgment of the Hegelian philosophy, in particular, prefers to explore the "details" – thematic and chronological fragments, for example, the individual stages of Hegel's creative work, and it does not make haste to generalize the results obtained to the

holistic view of Hegel's philosophy as a unified concept. This approach proved to be consonant with the established idea of Hegel's Collected Works in the Hegelian school as an "open" and essentially "infinite" text.

Getting acquainted with foreign literature on Hegel created over the past decade, and aiming to take into account results of Western colleagues' researches important in the context of our theme, in my opinion, we cannot deny ourselves in the right of treating them critically in those cases when approaches formed in Hegel studies hinder the formulation of new problems. In particular, it is unacceptable to reduce the study of Hegel's philosophy to consideration of Hegel's thought evolution process. In fact, modern foreign Hegel studies eliminate the task of studying Hegel's philosophy in terms of synchrony, and as a result the "system" is reduced to "the historically resulting sum". Philosophy arises and is formed, of course, "historically", but "history" cannot be considered as the sole explanatory context of philosophy. Claiming the attainment of "eternal" truths, philosophy cannot refuse claims to reduce all aspects of the formation process to a synchronous plane of the "system". Hegel's idea of philosophy, as a certainly synchronous entire, cannot be grasped at this approach (commonly referred to as "evolutionary and historical" methods, *entwicklungsgeschichtliche Methode*).

Thus, the structure of the Hegelian philosophy was not considered in the past decade as the central problem of any domestic or foreign historical and philosophy sciences. In the domestic philosophical culture until recently the Hegelian philosophy (and largely even today) have appeared mostly as an example of "dialectics" of philosophical thinking; "the system" in this context is perceived as a "limit" of the dialectical method, which, at best, only has to put up with. However, in the foreign literature on Hegel "evolutionary and historical" method dominates, for which the study of Hegel's philosophy is reduced to the consideration of "the history of the formation" of the philosopher's views. The problem of analysis of Hegel's philosophy as a unique integrity, though presented differently in different periods of the philosopher's creative life, is essentially eliminated by this approach.

If we recall that in the history of Hegel's thought study this situation was preceded by different factors when, for example, unscrupulous disciples of Hegel, acting as publishers of his "works", debacle that was made by criticism of Hegel's philosophy in the middle of the 19th century, and selective attitude towards various elements

in the Hegelian trends in the 20th century, so we can understand how difficult to us would be the problem of analyzing the structure of Hegel's philosophy, if we were intended to use only traditional approaches in the course of its handling and the content studied already in the scientific literature. Nevertheless, it is clear that any attempt to analyze the scientific problem can be carried out only under conditions of certain time and has to take into account its understanding which has been developed in the course of its study in previous years⁵.

2.4 The Problem of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* Subject

The questions of any precise definition of the subject of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* have been so far rarely raised in the scientific literature. The authors, who discussed the problem of *The Phenomenology* place in the "system", often have to be content with very vague ideas in this respect. The only case of the direct reference to the differences of opinions of "consciousness itself" and "our consciousness" in the previous literature, in which, moreover, the role of the latter in the phenomenological movement is emphasized, is found in J. Erdman's work⁶. Against this background, F. Engels puts himself above all his contemporaries – as, indeed, and much later – Hegel's interpreters by his remark about *The Phenomenology of Spirit* as embryology and paleontology of the spirit parallel⁷.

In the literature of the 20th century in the structure of the distribution of phenomenological thingness of the two levels – the observing consciousness and consciousness, which is the subject of observation, became widespread. In his lectures on *The Phenomenology of Spirit* Heidegger identifies the point of view of *The Phenomenology* subject with the "absolute knowledge" and, following this idea in *Hegel's Concept of Experience* says about the relation between the "absolute knowledge" and "natural consciousness" (Heidegger, 1957). A similar understanding of the nature of philosophical consciousness is also characteristic of O. Pöggeler⁸. Special mentions about the role of phenomenologist in the phenomenological movement are found in many contemporary authors' works, for example W. Bonsiepen directly speaks of "the central role of the philosopher" in *The Phenomenology*⁹, that the mind is led by the "philosopher" that is referred to as "we", etc. However, it should be noted that none of the contemporary authors are trying to investigate systematically the structure of

phenomenological thingness; in particular, they do not consider the structure of *The Phenomenology* subject as a basis for the consideration of the structure of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*.

J. Heinrichs and W. Marx advanced further than the other authors in dealing with the definition of *The Phenomenology* subject. Heinrichs identifies three “levels” or “points of view” of consciousness in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*: 1) the author’s opinion that following Heidegger and Pöggeler is identified by him with the point of view of the “science” itself; 2) the reader’s point of view, representing a kind of “modern philosophical consciousness”; 3) the point of view of “natural consciousness” which is the author and the reader’s subject of observation in *The Phenomenology*¹⁰. So Heinrichs distinguishes “scientific” mind of the author, “phenomenological” consciousness of the reader and the “natural” consciousness being the subject of their consideration. Accordingly, he says about the three “logics” in *The Phenomenology* as well – the logic of “direct” “phenomenological” and “speculative” levels (if to call them in the reverse order). W. Marx consistently points to the phenomenologist’s role (i.e. “our consciousness”), in particular, he quite definitely speaks about him as the initiator of the phenomenological movement and the systematician of the experience¹¹.

In the domestic literature we find the only example of discrimination of “our mind” and “consciousness itself” only in A. D. Vlasov’s work: “In considering the content of this work we must always remember about two fundamentally different types of consciousness. The first consciousness is the subject of the phenomenology of spirit or that consciousness, which, in fact, is spoken of. The second consciousness is the subject of the phenomenology of spirit, absolute spirit or the consciousness that suggests it. Both consciousnesses arise naturally, and are development products. But the emergence and development of the first consciousness is described in the phenomenology of spirit as the subject of the latter, and the second consciousness or subject, is the eventual result of this development and at the same time as the subject, makes possible that science as such. Due to two types of consciousness two types of truth are distinguished in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* – the truth for the first kind of consciousness or for a natural consciousness and the truth for the subject of the phenomenology of spirit or absolute spirit. The latter type of truths Hegel denoted as “for us or in itself”¹².

However, it should be noted, that none of the researchers distinguished the third level of phenomenological thingness so far – the actual “object” being-in-itself (“truth”, “essence”), although Hegel refers to it directly in the preface, and secondly, he didn’t consider the subject of *The Phenomenology* as a base for the solution of an issue on the internal structure of this work, without which in our opinion, the phenomenological movement, cannot be understood as an entire. Our own review in the first chapter of the study will start from the analysis of the problems of the subject and structure of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*.

2.5 The Problem of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* Structure

In the domestic literature the review of the structure of Hegel’s philosophy is limited (with very few exceptions) by the consideration of the structure of the encyclopedic system, with predominant idea of *Logic* as the center of all systematic constructions by Hegel. In foreign literature such an approach is substantiated in detail in the works by Höslé¹³. Whatever it was, but *The Phenomenology of Spirit* thus always recedes into the background. However, despite the fact that in Hegel’s school there were significant differences in the evaluation of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, Gabler, Rosencrantz and others had no doubt as for the propaedeutic value of *The Phenomenology* that it is able to perform the function of introduction to the system. However the understanding of *The Phenomenology* only as the introduction to the system typically generated the idea of the “redundancy” of Hegel’s work. In fact, the very first followers of Hegel, not without reason believed that it is sufficient for an introduction to take only that part of *The Phenomenology* which ends with *Mind* (which, in fact, will take place in *The Philosophy of Spirit*). And those who most strongly argued that *The Phenomenology* was created in the context of a fundamentally different nature of building a system of philosophy than the one that was realized in the form of the *Encyclopedia*, exactly sharper than others provoked raising the question of the internal structure of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. However, the need to discuss the problem of the structure of *The Phenomenology* was predetermined by the fact that the philosopher himself did not fully think this question over, what, in particular, is shown by uncertainties remaining in the external division of the text.

In recent decades, the question of the structure of

The Phenomenology of Spirit was discussed primarily in the context of the issue of the transition from Hegel's conception of *The Science of Consciousness Experience* to its implementation in the form of proper *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Most researchers often reduce the problem to finding the "break" in the text, the appearance of which, ostensibly, is determined by the difference between the original conception of the work and its implementation. For the modern reader the presence of several levels of narration in the text is obvious, however, the real problem is the explanation of how it is related to the specifics, "nature", of Hegel's work. The lack of previous attempts to study the structure of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* lies in the fact that their authors have not seen the need to resort to consideration of the phenomenological thingness structure, on the basis of which understanding the conceptual framework of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* can be achieved.

3. Methodology

The experience of studying Hegel's philosophy assures that its reconstruction can be carried out only when a researcher accepts some very specific methodological principles. Firstly, it must be acknowledged that only some of Hegel's implementation plans of creating philosophical system were actualized in the form of deployed conceptual constructions. If the researchers seek to comprehend their contents and, moreover, to bring it in unity, they must choose to separate them – as texts, revealing a substantial theoretical content of their philosophy, – from other judgments about the system of philosophy which have not received a detailed implementation. So in the research practice there appears a specific idea of "the text autonomy" as a formal principle of interpretation. In this case the text is understood as an autonomous and self-sufficient unit, which can preserve the independence not only of the circumstances of its origin, but also from those author's statements which are understood today as not entirely corresponding to his/her main intention, or even difficult to reconcile with him.

The last ground that is able to convince researchers of the need for adopting the principle of "the text autonomy" is the realization of their own objective logic of the subject, which is reflected in the text. But this awareness can happen, of course, only if the interpreter has the opportunity to independently consider the subject, the

path to which the author twinkles for every reader by his/her creation. Thus, the second methodological guideline to be adopted by the researcher of the Hegelian system of philosophy is the principle of "self-examination" of the research subject by the interpreter. In contrast to the first principle, it is meaningful, its value is determined by the fruitfulness of its use in a specific research practice and justification of its adoption – by what, in fact, saw a researcher in the subject, and to what extent it contributes to the understanding of the subject, and to which degree it helps comprehend the subject the foundation of which the creation of the spirit under investigation laid.

The starting point of the approach reflected in this article is the idea of the need to clarify the concept of thingness in Hegel's philosophy. That is because the Logic and real philosophy describe the motion of types of thingness constituted in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, then the problem solution of ratio of these elements of encyclopedic system is also to be found in *The Phenomenology*. Such formulation of the problem is able to define a new prospect of research of building Hegel's philosophy structure. Along with the solution of problem of the relation of logic and real philosophy an appeal to *The Phenomenology of Spirit* has a purpose of clarification of the structure of this fundamental Hegelian work, since not only the system of Hegel's philosophy is based on *The Phenomenology* but *The Phenomenology*, of course, can only be understood in the terms of "system", because apart from "the result", *The Phenomenology*, which kind is the "system", there is no other random point of view about it.

But *The Phenomenology* and *Logic* fundamentally solve different problems in the process of understanding speculative thingness. (This fact is ignored by those researchers who believe that *Logic* as the first part of the encyclopedic system is "self-substantiating" basis). *The Phenomenology of Spirit* shows the process of the formation of speculative thingness (deploys the proof of the need for adoption of a transcendental point of view in philosophy) and *Science of Logic* is its specific categorical embodiment, or the implementation of speculative thingness concept. This should be borne in mind in the course of acquaintance with recreating the processes of formation and implementation of speculative thingness represented by us as the most important stages of the unfolding of Hegel's philosophical and systematic thought.

So, if the consideration of *The Phenomenology of*

Spirit reveals the specifics of speculative thingness and indicates its difference from other subject levels (as a result the inevitability of “transition” of logical idea in nature disappears), then the consideration of *Science of Logic* allows us to describe the movement of this actual philosophical thingness. Thus, *Logic* and real philosophy are kept as elements of the system, based on *The Phenomenology*.

4. Results

The investigation of the structure of Hegel’s system of philosophy¹⁴ shows that the ratio of the *Logic* and real philosophy in it can only be understood in view of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* experience, as the elements of encyclopedic system describe different types of thingness which are constituted in the phenomenological movement. The subject matters of *Logic* and real philosophy differ in structural organization: the structure of the logical thingness is defined by Hegel as “infinity” (“true infinity”). The real philosophy focuses on thingness where the depth of the mediation of opposites fails to achieve the plasticity of “infinity”. Precisely in the *Science of Logic* the evolution of forms of the method motion leads to “the absolute idea” as a speculative ideal, a completion of Hegel’s philosophy¹⁴.

The study of the systematic structure of the Hegelian philosophy helps clarify the structure of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* as well revealing that it describes the movement of the three levels of thingness, each of which ends with “infinity”, the constituting the speculative (logical) thingness. In accordance with this it appears that Hegel’s work consists of three parts (“circles”), identical by their logical content.

One should agree with the latest Hegel studies that Hegel’s philosophy – and the idea of “the system of philosophy” as the center of its content – evolved throughout Hegel’s creative life. The history of the evolution of these views has been adequately studied by now. But at this in my view the history and philosophy should select that invariant of Hegel’s idea evolution which would allow understanding his work as something integral. According to the results of the research conducted, such an invariant system of philosophy of Hegel is his *System of Science* project. It was he who connects all periods and stages of spiritual evolution of the philosopher: it is referred to the original intuitions of the young thinker, familiar to us from “youth’s manuscripts”, those intuitions, understanding

of which led to the maturation of Hegel’s concept of spirit; *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Science of Logic* which implemented a *System of Science* plan appeared as philosophical (“scientific”) comprehension of these intuitions, and, therefore, can be considered as problem solving, absorbing Hegel in the course of “adolescence”; it is referred to the system of the *Encyclopedia of Philosophic Sciences* as the last image of the Hegelian system, in which all its contents appeared suited to the practice of university teaching organized in accordance not with the proper research, but rather, in accordance with the methodological and pedagogical principles.

The study of *The Phenomenology* and *Logic*, having implemented the plan of the *System of Science* as the core, historically significant, content of Hegel’s philosophical works contributes to the preservation the very concept of “Hegel’s philosophy” in the historical and philosophical science – despite the fact that, again, the views of the philosopher himself as to the appropriate image of his system of philosophy, indeed, continued to change, moreover they changed both after the affirmation of intention (completion of the Jena period), and once with the publication of *Science of Logic*, it essentially turned out to be implemented. In the context of the history of Western philosophy the *System of Science* has the right to be called the *System of Hegel’s philosophy* to a greater extent than *Encyclopedia*, moreover it is because it completes the new European classical philosophy – the “philosophy of science” – as due to its consistently transcendentalist solution to the question of the subject of philosophy it frees philosophy from the duty to provide sciences with its epistemic-methodological support. *Encyclopedia*, in contrast to *The Phenomenology* and *Logic*, is in many ways no longer part (the completion) of modern European philosophy, but the beginning of that rational comprehension of this tradition, a continuation of which is the whole philosophy of 19-20th centuries.

The undertaken consideration of the *Logic* and the real philosophy as elements of the system that grow out of *The Phenomenology*, releases *Encyclopedia* from the insoluble problem of “transition” of logical idea to nature and thus demonstrates its logical consistency, although at that the components of *Encyclopedia* are conceivable only as elements of the system based on phenomenology, but not as an independent system, as artificial in *Encyclopedia* are precisely the relationship of its parts, the “sequence” of *Logic* and the real philosophy deprived of the phenomenological basis.

The analysis of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Science of Logic* allows us to formulate the basic principles of Hegel's philosophy, to establish its structure and to understand the relationship of its elements, as well as to establish a relationship of Hegel's philosophy to his encyclopedic system. As a result the consideration of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Science of Logic* reveals that in each of these Hegel's works the "structure of the philosophical system" is reflected substantially in its entirety – with the difference, however, that in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* the "structure of the philosophical system" is natural for consciousness sequence of stages (methods) of spirit understanding, whereas in *Science of Logic* we are talking about their own relationship, taken in accordance with their net certainty ratio.

5. Discussion

Proceeding from what was said above about the history of interpretation of the Hegelian heritage, it is clear that it is pointless just to list the works in one way or another affected by the philosophical and systemic issues. The theoretical content of the vast majority of works about Hegel's philosophy in an aspect we are interested in is similar; the differences between them are due either to time – and then the literature is divided into "apologetic" (disciples), "critical" (which arose as a result of changes in relation to the classical philosophy in general), "Hegelian" (related to the content of the Hegelian philosophy selectively and essentially only pragmatically), and "relating to Hegel studies" (preferring specifically interpreted "reliability" and "accuracy" of judgment to "understanding"), or personal, subjective features of the authors' relationship to Hegel. It seems more preferable in this situation to point to the works, the study of which is able to draw attention to the most important unsolved problems in the research of Hegel's philosophy.

5.1 The Debate about the place of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* in the System of Hegel's Philosophy in Hegelianism

If we take into account only the overall evaluation, which for a quarter of a century Hegel managed to give to his first work, it is possible to come to a conclusion that the question of the place which *The Phenomenology* really takes in Hegel's system was not only resolved by its author, but it seemed quite natural that this issue could be seen by Hegel's followers and interpreters as irreconcilable.

Discord in the estimates of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, typical of the "school", of his direct disciples, under these circumstances, can hardly come as a surprise. The most important publications, which provide an overview of discussions having lasted more than a century, appeared in 60-70s, when the study of the problem of place and role of *The Phenomenology* in the "system" started to expand in the foreign history of philosophy on a new methodological basis – in accordance with the principles of modern "Hegel studies". Let us dwell on the most important points, becoming evident to the modern reader on the basis of these and similar to them in their sense works.

Today's debate on the place of *The Phenomenology* among Hegel's works came back to the evaluation of the philosopher himself and the discussions about his heritage, unfolded among his followers and critics. In this regard, it is apparent that a review of the present state of the problem should be commenced from the middle of the 19th century, when the main trends in understanding the place and role of *The Phenomenology* in Hegel's system appeared. Among the disciples of Hegel there was no consensus on this question: Gabler, although agreeing with the fact that *The Phenomenology* is not included directly in the philosophy, claimed that it is the beginning of it, the necessary propaedeutics to it¹⁵; Rosenkranz was of a similar opinion¹⁶; on the other hand, Michelet argued that *The Phenomenology* was only a milestone in the development of Hegel's thought, a preparatory stage for a future system of philosophy¹⁷; Heinrichs also believed that the system should not have to possess any beginning or completion, and every beginning in philosophy, in essence, destined to be a sham because all the parts of philosophy are interrelated, although the "consciousness" as a point of view of *The Phenomenology* has all the same, in his opinion, the advantage of the natural beginning of philosophy¹⁸.

Such discord is undoubtedly connected not only with the complexity of Hegel's work itself, but also with the fundamental nature of the problem of *The Phenomenology* place in the system to understand the creative work of the philosopher. The experience of modern research of the history of *The Phenomenology* interpretation, which began in the Hegelian school, convinces that the review of the views on the place and role of *The Phenomenology* in the system limited only by their "impartial" description and not delving into substantive discussion of the problem, is unlikely to be productive; only enumeration of the views expressed and approaches formulated can

cause, as it may seem, just dizziness. For example, H. F. Fulda¹⁸ distinguishes more than a dozen approaches, and in the result of their classification on the basis of purely formal features thinkers that gave significantly different assessments of Hegel's work they are in the near headings.

From the middle of the 19th century Michelet's representation of *The Phenomenology* as a work that should be considered only as a stage of development of Hegel's systematic thought becomes prevailing in historical and philosophical literature. In the current system, *The Phenomenology*, allegedly with the designation as the "first part" of the system loses the role of the introduction into it, as the need to prove the point of view of absolute knowledge existed only before deploying it into a closed system. At the same time the idea of the fundamental identity of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* with the same fragment of the *Philosophy of Spirit* was finally approved that eliminated the need to prove (unprovable, of course) thesis about the complete rejection by Hegel from the content of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*.

5.2 Discussions about the Place of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* in the System of Hegel's Philosophy in the Neo-Hegelian Currents

It should be noted, however, that the negative assessment of the role of *The Phenomenology* in Hegel's system was never commonly accepted; for example, George Bailie speaks about *The Phenomenology of Spirit* as the first and remaining the only one in the history of thought attempt to comprehend the human experience as a whole¹⁹; at the same time T. Haering develops a perspective on Hegelian philosophy in which no more attention is paid to *The Phenomenology* than to any philosopher or the manuscript of his lecture course²⁰. And yet, in the 20th century the history of the study of Hegel's philosophy has developed in such a way that it is the understanding of incomplete, imperfect structure of the first Hegel's work, even the contingency of his conception and the haste of its implementation, that is precisely the ideas that if not initiated by Haering, then, anyway, found a new lease of life due to him, turned out to be dominant both in foreign and domestic literature in recent decades. Suffice it to mention that J. Hoffmeister and J. Hippolite were under the influence of T. Haering's beliefs; they are easily connected with the concept of "gap" in the philosopher's systems thinking satisfying both those who believe the

Hegelian idea to be "radically historical", and those who (somewhat old-fashioned) speak of *Encyclopedia* as the only convincing way of Hegel's philosophical system.

It was R. Kroner who saw in the transition from the *System of Science* project based on the *The Phenomenology* to *Encyclopedia* project an expression of the fact that the point of view of "absolute idealism" in Hegel's mind takes top above the point of view of "transcendental idealism"²¹; H. Glockner, going back essentially to the interpretation by H. Heinrichs, asserts that the system of philosophy has no single necessary basis as such, any point can serve as such because every point of view in philosophy still leads to absolute knowledge²². For Glockner the evolution of Hegel's system of thought from *The Phenomenology* to *Encyclopedia* is no longer just a kind of "natural" process as for Michelet and Haym, but also the "destiny" of Hegel's philosophy, which having found its real base in the concept, just had to abandon *The Phenomenology* as alleged, a random –only "biographically" first – path to the system.

That consideration of the problem of relation between *The Phenomenology* and "system" which Heidegger offers in his lectures on *The Phenomenology of Spirit* is non-traditional for the literature of the 20th century. He drew attention to the fact that the very name of *Science of Logic* shows the connection with the *System of Science* project²³. Moreover, Heidegger quite rightly expresses both correct and requiring only concretization point of view according to which *The Phenomenology* and *Logic* present a system as a whole. Prior to Heidegger a closer look at *The Phenomenology* and *Logic* was expressed by J. Bailey, who believed that they are different "in relation to the principle of the whole, which in *The Phenomenology* finds expression just at the end, and in *Logic* – at the beginning"¹⁸.

Apparently, a similar understanding of the relation of *The Phenomenology*, *Logic* and the "system" is able to warn against the temptation to link them with naively understood "treatment", in which allegedly the first just disappears in the second, what makes a distinction between *The Phenomenology* and *Logic* as "subjective" and "objective" basis of philosophical system, and from the abstract idea of the encyclopedic system as a closed system of "totality", indifferent to the path that leads to it, and absorbing in its infinite depth any similar way. A speculative structure of "treatment", being fundamental to Hegel, while covering both the correlation of *The Phenomenology* and *Science of Logic* should be understood as an ideal (perfect) reflection of the

consciousness experience movement in the movement of logical categories (which justifies the search for the match between them as well), rather than “sublation”, in which allegedly phenomenological path disappears in the logical elements. The reason for occurrence of such an assumption is that Hegel's transcendentalism accepting as the subject of philosophy only being-certainty, does not only put the existence beyond the rational and finding expression in the word of philosophical consideration, but also identifies the being-certainty with being in general, or drives being to its certainty. This position is the result of a “subjective” choice of the author, but by no means inevitable logic of its motion. In fact, the “treatment” is a universal structure of a speculative mediation, but it does not bind the “being” and “certainty”, the experience of consciousness and logical categories, *The Phenomenology* and *Logic* by the notorious “sublation”.

We will also note that since the negativity of consciousness, generating thingness in the process of phenomenological movement, is absolute, its movement in Absolute Knowledge reaches immediacy, simplicity; and now thingness itself, absorbing all the content of the way passed by the consciousness in *The Phenomenology*, stands as the absolute thingness– “logical idea”, “logical”. It is against this background that Hegel had the illusion that this being is as a substance, being of pre-Kantian metaphysics – remains “in itself”, and exists also beyond experience. It is here that the first proper metaphysical transformation is accomplished. “Transformation” as a mechanism for the generation of thingness in the process of the phenomenological movement, which Hegel wrote about in the preface, is extrapolated here actually on being-in-itself –thingness, logically prior to *The Phenomenology*, thingness to which *The Phenomenology* leads, but which does not depend from it, and moreover, it predetermines its possibility itself. The birth of the Spirit occurred within the boundaries of *The Phenomenology* and completed it; the imposition of a logical idea as the objective side completing the evolution of the Spirit of Absolute Knowledge beyond Phenomenology proved to be able to revive the idea of the being independent from transcendental consciousness structures of the old metaphysics. The objective side of mental images having reached perfection and simplicity emerges as abiding outside their movement absolute being, in relation to which the mental images themselves are only forms of its comprehension (and their movement – the Phenomenology). The fundamental question of the whole

of Hegel's philosophy, therefore, is the sense in which we can talk about the being-in-itself – just as indwelling in experience as a moment of its movement, or also outside the experience – even though as its border.

5.3 Discussions about the Place of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* in the System of Hegel's Philosophy in the Modern Hegel Studies

A new surge of interest in relation to the problem of *The Phenomenology* with *Logic* and *Encyclopedia*, as already been noted, came in the 60-70s. H. F. Fulda aims to show that the encyclopedic system needs the introduction no less than *Logic* in the context of *System of Science* conception¹⁸. However, as in the case with the consideration of the history of views on the place of *The Phenomenology* in Hegel's system, the lack of analysis of meaningful connection of Hegelian works does not allow him to definitely establish what, in fact, is the significance of *The Phenomenology* for *Logic* and *Encyclopedia*. In our view, the need for such an analysis follows already from a review of existing approaches to the problem of *The Phenomenology* place in the system undertaken by Fulda, however, he does not make this conclusion. The same reproach in abstractedness of consideration and the uncertainty of conclusions on the correlation of *The Phenomenology* and “system” may be addressed to O. Peggeler, who argues that the tension between *The Phenomenology*, *Logic* and real philosophy is insurmountable, and therefore (in accordance with the principles of evolutionary-historical method) only speaks of the need to review the way of the philosopher's thoughts as the only way to understand it.

Undertaken from these positions efforts to addressing the problem of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* place in Hegel's system cannot ignore the question of its relation to the earlier system projects of the philosopher. In the *System of Science* project *The Phenomenology* as an introduction to the system of philosophy takes, apparently, the place that in earlier Jena system projects was taken by logic preceding metaphysics and the structure of the system received was as follows: Logic – metaphysics – applied disciplines (philosophy of nature, philosophy of mind, a system of morality). Despite the fact that this structure is definitely close to the *Encyclopedia* outline, the statement of Minor logic within the boundaries of the encyclopedic system as the first element of the philosophic system

cannot be regarded simply as a return to Jena systems projects after the “short-term” role as the introduction to *The Phenomenology of Spirit* system. It is unacceptable to identify the Jena Logic of “ultimate reflection” preceding metaphysics, with the *Science of Logic* deepening the concept of infinity systematically grounded by *The Phenomenology*. *Science of Logic* itself – genetically and structurally – is linked to *The Phenomenology*, while its relationship with the Jena outlines of logic (even if we digress from that “didactic-pedagogic” component plays in them is not less important role than “creative”), of course, is only fragmentary.

Rather, in my view, we should pay attention to the fact that the identification of logic and metaphysics by Hegel falls exactly at the time when *The Phenomenology* is created: the search for an adequate introduction to the system, previously unsuccessfully conducted by Hegel in the way of creating the logic which preceded metaphysics leads to *The Phenomenology* as the only organic introduction to the philosophical system. *The Phenomenology* by way of a specially organized dialectical movement of immediate consciousness constitutes speculative thingness, the picture of self-evolution of which will be *Science of Logic*, performing functions of logic and “transcendental metaphysics” in the system.

The value of the evolution of systems projects of Jena period for understanding the naturalness (and even regularities) of emergence of *The Phenomenology* conception is, therefore, that the logic in them, in the end, parted with the role of “introduction” to philosophy, a place of “introduction” to the system is released, it is taken by “suddenly” appearing *Phenomenology* and the logic itself merging with metaphysics serves as a systematic disclosure of the result made by *The Phenomenology*– the “Absolute Knowledge”. Consequently, *The Phenomenology*, apparently, would not have emerged if the logic had been perceived as the introduction, the form of consciousness of the ultimate reflection, and if understanding of the logical problems had not revealed its real place in the system of philosophy – the reflection of the scope of entities (categories) having not only logical, but also substantial universal value. However, on the other hand, this claim of the logic will push its author to completely abandon *The Phenomenology* as a necessary introduction and the first element of the philosophic system that will generate statements defamatory *Phenomenology* in the future. Such uncertainty being the reason for their emergency disappears if, in addition to formal evaluations, given to

The Phenomenology and its place in the system by Hegel, one considers in detail the substantive relationship linking it to *Logic* and *Encyclopedia*.

6. Conclusion

The undertaken consideration of *Logic* and real philosophy as the elements of the system that grew out of *The Phenomenology* releases *Encyclopedia* from the intractable problem of “transition” of logical idea in nature and thus demonstrates its logical consistency. At that the component parts of *Encyclopedia* are conceivable only as elements of a system based on *The Phenomenology*, but not as an independent system, as artificial in *Encyclopedia* is precisely the relationship of its parts, the “sequence” of logic and the real philosophy deprived of the phenomenological basis. In fact, a logical idea and nature (spirit) are linked in Hegel’s philosophy not directly – for example, in the movement of “transition” – but as elements of phenomenological forming, at that a transition from form making of consciousness constituting the object of a real philosophy to form making constituting a matter of logic appears real and conceivable.

Thus, it is *The Phenomenology of Spirit* that makes possible encyclopedic system as well, though not as a separate system of philosophy but as a part of it. *The Phenomenology* performs this function, because it constitutes the subject of a real philosophy, constitutes a subject matter of *Logic*, and also defines the structural relationship of objects of *Logic* and real philosophy as the ratio of the “infinity” to the set of its unfinished moments. As one can see, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, the Meisterstück of a young thinker, almost immediately after its creation driven out of the system of philosophy, and thus suffering a sorrowful fate of another of Hegel’s brainchild, actually continues nobly keep watch as a keeper of system of philosophy planned in Jena.

Despite the fact that this book is more than two hundred years, today it appears young before each new reader – it seems to continue to keep in itself all its substantial wealth in anticipation of the interlocutor who can reject prejudices and misunderstandings of the past decades and will be able to adequately evaluate its advantages. So, the problem of the internal structure of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* is still very far from solving. In my opinion, the “key” to its solution is proposed by my understanding of the structure of phenomenological

thingness, because the structure of the text is, ultimately, an expanded structure of the subject, which it describes. Relationship of *The Phenomenology* to the later works of the philosopher and its role in the system of Hegel's philosophy – that is another – “framework” theme, without thinking of which it is impossible to advance in understanding the place of *The Phenomenology* in the history of European philosophy. Now it is the time to start a systematic study of the values of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* for the methodology of modern humanitarian knowledge. It seems that, in contrast to the 19th century, almost forgotten *Phenomenology*, and in contrast to the 20th century, focusing on social and existential components of Hegel's text, a new century of *The Phenomenology* life in its interpretations is able to determine its significance for understanding the structure and stylistics of narrative practices. Every narration and all forms of communication involve the observer – our living consciousness that carries an entire history of their culture in a contracted form and every moment again able to make it the starting point of the next “journey of discovery”.

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