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The Structure of the Nigerian Economy and Electoral Violence: Implications for Political Participation in Nigeria


 

The Nigerian economy is a middle-income that has agriculture and the government as the major source of employment. Though in principle, the country is a mixed economy where the means of production are own and control between the government and the private sectors, but in practice, there is an overconcentration of economic powers on the government. This monopoly is yet compounded by the ‘winner takes all’ formula implicit in the constitution. Also, the absence of runner-up value and the enormous executive power explicit in the Nigeria federalism further made winning an election a lot more profitable than just governance. Therefore, instead of aiding a peaceful transition of power, election often turns into a battlefield due to the selfish interests of the dominant class. In this way, political actors, therefore, employ every means during elections to capture political power. Using Marxian theory of the post-colonial state, the paper concludes that the nature of the Nigerian fiscal federalism which over-centralized economic powers on the government made political office an avenue for personal aggrandizement, and thus, breeds corruption and election violence. Therefore, the battle for the control and distribution of national wealth raises the stake and likelihood of violence during elections. The implication for political participation was outlined and the study recommends for a constitutional review that will empower states to use their resources to develop their region.


Keywords

Nigeria, economic structure, electoral violence, political participation
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  • The Structure of the Nigerian Economy and Electoral Violence: Implications for Political Participation in Nigeria

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Abstract


The Nigerian economy is a middle-income that has agriculture and the government as the major source of employment. Though in principle, the country is a mixed economy where the means of production are own and control between the government and the private sectors, but in practice, there is an overconcentration of economic powers on the government. This monopoly is yet compounded by the ‘winner takes all’ formula implicit in the constitution. Also, the absence of runner-up value and the enormous executive power explicit in the Nigeria federalism further made winning an election a lot more profitable than just governance. Therefore, instead of aiding a peaceful transition of power, election often turns into a battlefield due to the selfish interests of the dominant class. In this way, political actors, therefore, employ every means during elections to capture political power. Using Marxian theory of the post-colonial state, the paper concludes that the nature of the Nigerian fiscal federalism which over-centralized economic powers on the government made political office an avenue for personal aggrandizement, and thus, breeds corruption and election violence. Therefore, the battle for the control and distribution of national wealth raises the stake and likelihood of violence during elections. The implication for political participation was outlined and the study recommends for a constitutional review that will empower states to use their resources to develop their region.


Keywords


Nigeria, economic structure, electoral violence, political participation