War, Economy, Congress, and Presidents’ Usage of Executive Orders

This study examines the elements that influence presidents' use of executive orders. Particularly, it is interested in the conditions under which presidents exercise their unitary power. Theories of presidential leadership propose three prominent factors to explain these conditions: institutional conditions, political demands, and personal resources. Previous studies show that presidents issue more executive orders during war and economic hardship than at other times. But we do not know how these external conditions will shape the relationship between presidential use of unitary power and the composition of Congress. With these theories we cannot answer this question, because they tackle the sources of presidential power from disparate perspectives. As an alternative, I propose an integrative theory which emphasizes the interaction between external conditions and institutional actors. This study tests the theory by using important executive orders (1936-2008). The findings show that international and domestic crises (i.e., war and economic hardship) provide presidents with more opportunities to issue executive orders with the help of Congress than in situations lacking a crisis.