Journal of Commerce and Accounting Research

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Pervasiveness of Corporate Illegality:The Effects of Board of Directors Characteristics


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1 Department of Commerce, Post Graduate Govt. College for Girls, Chandigarh, India
     

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An ever-increasing rate of illegalities in the corporate world is a reason for concern and the most daunting global challenge. The advent of sophisticated technologies has facilitated the exploitation of regulatory loopholes by white collar criminals. Taking note of the economic crisis caused due to corporate failures, it is important to investigate the role played by corporate directors in thwarting such occurrences. With the help previous literature, this paper discusses the specific board aspects which are likely to have a significant effect on the occurrence of corporate illegality. A few research propositions are presented to understand the influence of the board of directors’ characteristics on the incidence of corporate illegality.

Keywords

Corporate Illegality, Board of Directors, Corporate Governance, Corporate Fraud.
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  • Pervasiveness of Corporate Illegality:The Effects of Board of Directors Characteristics

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Authors

Gundeep Kaur Virk
Department of Commerce, Post Graduate Govt. College for Girls, Chandigarh, India

Abstract


An ever-increasing rate of illegalities in the corporate world is a reason for concern and the most daunting global challenge. The advent of sophisticated technologies has facilitated the exploitation of regulatory loopholes by white collar criminals. Taking note of the economic crisis caused due to corporate failures, it is important to investigate the role played by corporate directors in thwarting such occurrences. With the help previous literature, this paper discusses the specific board aspects which are likely to have a significant effect on the occurrence of corporate illegality. A few research propositions are presented to understand the influence of the board of directors’ characteristics on the incidence of corporate illegality.

Keywords


Corporate Illegality, Board of Directors, Corporate Governance, Corporate Fraud.

References