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An Empirical Evaluation of the Determinants of Executive Perks at S&P 500 Firms


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1 School of Business at the University of Prince Edward Island, Canada
     

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This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of executive perks at S&P 500 firms using manually collected panel data. CEOs receive perks more frequently and at higher levels than other named executive officers (NEOs). In general, S&P 500 firms with larger growth opportunities, realized growth, stock returns, and return on assets are less likely to provide perks and provide lower levels of perks when they do. Firms with powerful CEOs are more likely to provide perks. Firm size and executive monetary compensation are the most influential determinants of the value of perks. Overall, tenure and gender do not impact the likelihood or value of perk compensation at S&P 500 companies.

Keywords

Perquisites, Executive Compensation, Competitive Market, Private Benefits.
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  • An Empirical Evaluation of the Determinants of Executive Perks at S&P 500 Firms

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Authors

Andrew Carrothers
School of Business at the University of Prince Edward Island, Canada

Abstract


This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of executive perks at S&P 500 firms using manually collected panel data. CEOs receive perks more frequently and at higher levels than other named executive officers (NEOs). In general, S&P 500 firms with larger growth opportunities, realized growth, stock returns, and return on assets are less likely to provide perks and provide lower levels of perks when they do. Firms with powerful CEOs are more likely to provide perks. Firm size and executive monetary compensation are the most influential determinants of the value of perks. Overall, tenure and gender do not impact the likelihood or value of perk compensation at S&P 500 companies.

Keywords


Perquisites, Executive Compensation, Competitive Market, Private Benefits.

References